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Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents: 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s, The Visible Hand 
, after Twenty Years 
Two decades have passed since the publication of The Visible 
Hand, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s, magisterial account of the 
rise of the modern business enterprise in the United States. 
Although Chandler's pathbreaking work has been widely 
hailed as a landmark in business history, only rarely has any-
one considered systematically its influence on the large body 
of historical scholarship on related topics. This essay is 
intended to help ftll this gap. It is divided into two sections. 
The first section reviews Chandler's argument, touches on 
the relationship of Chandler's oeuvre to his personal back-
ground, and locates The Visible Hand in the context of 
American historical writing. The second considers how three 
groups of historians have responded to Chandler's ideas. 
These groups consist of champions who creatively elaborated 
on Chandler's intellectual agenda; critics who probed anom-
alies between Chandler's argument and their own r_esearch; 
and skeptics who rejected Chandler's analysis outright. 
T'he Visible Hand has, of course, been influential in many fields out-side of American history Chandler has always aspired to reach a 
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cross-disciplinary audience and, to an extent that may well be unprece-
dented among historians of the United States, has entered successful-
ly into a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue with scholars throughout the 
social sciences.1 Political scientists, economists, sociologists, organiza-
tional theorists, specialists in business administration, and historians of 
Europe, Japan, and multinational enterprise have all drawn fruitfully 
on Chandler's ideas. So, too, have business consultants in the United 
States and abroad.2 
1 For a brief introduction to Chandler's influence on nonhistorians see Thomas K. McCr~w, "The Intellectual Odyssey of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.," in M'ccraw, ed., The 
Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business (Boston, 
Ma:i~·, 198~), ~sp. 13-14 .. ~or various interpretations of Chandler's ideas by sociologists and 
political s?ren~sts, see _VY1ll1an: G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial 
Corporation in America {Pnnceton, N.J., 1997); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of 
Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass., 1990); Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: 
A Search for Limits i~ an Age of High Technology {Chicago, Ill., 1986); and James R. Beniger, 
The Co~trol Revolution: Techn~logical and Economic Origins of the Information Society 
(Cam~ndge, Mass., 1986). For Chandler's influence among economists, see William 
Lazom~k, Business. C:rganization and the Myth of the Market Economy (Cambridge, 1991), 
and Ohver E. W11Iiamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting {New York, 1985). 
. Tho~~h Cha~~:r's influ~nce among economists falls outside of the scope of this essay, 
Oliver W1lhamson s transaction cost" interpretation of Chandler's ideas deserves a brief 
mention, since it has sometimes been mistakenly assumed to reflect Chandler's ideas. 
Acco~ding to.Williamson, Cha:ri:dler claimed that the principal cost savings in the modem cor-
poration denved from the ability of managers to economize on transaction and information 
costs. Chandler, however, always distinguished between the modest cost savings obtainable 
thro~gh reduction of tr~sacti?n and information costs and the much larger cost savings 
obtrunable through admm1strative coordination. "The savings resulting from such [adminis-
trative} coordii:ation," Chandl~r obseived, "were much greater than those resulting from 
lower information and transact10n costs." To clarify this distinction, Chandler contrasted the 
cos~ savings obt~nable through. the establishment of a federation of otheiwise independent 
business firms with the cost savmgs obtainable through the establishment of a modem busi-
~ess ent~rprise. Federa~ons, Chandler wrote, "were often able to bring 811Ulll reductions in 
mfo~ation and transactions c:ists, but they could not lower costs through increased pro-
ductivity. They could not provide the administrative coordination that became the central 
function ?f modem.bu~iness e~terprise." Alfred D, Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in Amencan Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 7-8 (italics added). 
See als~ id:m, "Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial 
Enterpnse, Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (Summer 1992): 79-100, and Lazonick, 
Business Organization, 191-261. "'By imposing a transaction cost interpretation on 
Chandler's historical .m~terial,". Lazonick declared, "Williamson failed to comprehend the 
nature of the dynanuc interaction between organization and technology that is central to 
[Chandler's] approach," 195. 
2 Chandler's influence on management thought has been so peivasive that, according to 
Cha~dler, a manager once advised a colleague that he could save the $100,000 fee that 
Mc Kinsey & Company was charging corporations to oversee their reorganization by reading 
a copy of Chandler's Strategy and Structure, which could be purchased for $2.95. Chandler, 
"Comparative Business History," in D. C. Coleman and Peter Mathias, eds., Enterprise and 
History {Cambridge, 1984), 16. 
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Indeed, Chandler"s ideas may well have had more impact outside 
of the historical profession than within it.3 Given current trends in 
American historiography, this is not particularly surprising. Yet it is 
unfortunate, since this relative neglect has served to obscure the dis-
tinctiveness of his achievement. Few of the non-historians who have 
drawn on The Visible Hand share Chandler's historiographical preoc-
cupation with issues of periodization, causation, and narrative design. 
Fewer still have focused on what may well be its single most suggestive 
contribution to the social sciences: namely, its linkage of an empirical-
ly gronnded model of the stages of American economic development 
with a technologically based explanation of organizational innovation. 
This essay brings these often neglected issues into the foreground. By 
focusing on Chandler's stage model and his explanatory scheme, it is 
my hope that we can enrich our understanding of one of the most sen1-
inal works of historical scholarship to have been published in the 
United States during the past fifty years.4 
• • • 
Like many great works of history, The Visible I1 and revolved around a 
deceptively simple question. How, Chandler asked, could the rise of 
the modern business enterprise in the United States best be explained? 
To answer this question, Chandler surveyed the history of every indus-
trial enterprise in the United States in 1917 that had assets of more 
than $20 million. Chandler's survey revealed that the largest firms in 
the American economy clustered in a relatively small number of indus-
tries. Certain industries, such as oil refining and steel, were dominat-
ed by large firms. Others industries, such as textiles and shoes, were 
not. To explain this pattern, Chandler looked at these firms' function-
al characteristics. The largest firms, Chandler observed, could be 
found in those sectors of the economy in which the "visible hand" of 
management had supplanted the "invisible hand" of the market in 
coordinating the production and distribution of goods. The principal 
reason for this pattern, he concluded, was technological. Industries 
3 For Chandler's influence on historical scholarship, see Louis Galambos, ''Technology, 
Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational 
Synthesis," Business History Review 57 (Winter 1983): 471--493, and Alan Brinkley, ''Writing 
the }Iistory of Contemporary Arnerica: Dile1nmas and Challenges," Daedalus 113 {Summer 
1984), 132-134. 
4 Chandler is by no means the only economic historian to devise institutional models of 
economic development. So, too, has Douglass C. North. See, for example, North's 
Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Peeformance (Cambridge, 1990). 
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dominated by a small number'~f firms took advantage of technological 
advances in production and distribution; industries that remained 
decentralized did not. The persistence of economic competition in 
decentralized industries owed less to the entrepreneurial failings of 
their managers than to these industries' technological character. 
Chandler readily cqnceded that business leaders might introduce new 
technologies for a Variety of reasons, including a desire to secure mar-
ket poweror social control. In the long term, however, only those firms 
that deployed new technologies to increase efficiency remained pros-
perous and powerful.5 The main determinants of organizational inno-
vation-Chandler observed, in reviewing the work of a historian who 
had reached a different conclusion-were to be found neither in the 
social nor the political setting, but, rather, in the "technological imper-
atives" of mass production and mass distribution in urban, industrial 
mass societies such as the United States.6 
Although Chandler regarded technology as a major determinant of 
industrial structure, he remained much impressed with the role of the 
market as a catalyst for change. "The new bureaucratic enterprises did 
not, it must be emphasized,'' Chandler explained, "replace the market 
as the primary force in generating goods and services" (italics added). 
What the modern business enterprise did, rather, was to supplant the 
market in coordinating the flow of goods and services from the pro-
ducer to the consumer. 7 'Whether or not consumers made intelligent 
choices was a subject that Chandler left for others to decide. 
5 
"Although mergers and acquisitions were carried out in a wide variety of industries for 
a wide variety of reasons," Chandler explained, "these combinations remained profitable and 
powerful over the long haul only if they rationalized the facilities acquired or merged, com-
pleted the process of integrating production with distribution, and most important of all, cre-
ated an extensive managerial hierarchy to coordinate, monitor, and allocate resources to the 
operations units acquired or merged. Even when this course was followed, an enterprise was 
rarely able to dominate, to become part of an oligopoly, unless it could benefit from lower 
unit costs achieved through administrative coordination-that is, unless the technology of 
that industry permitted the volume production of standardized products for national and 
international markets." Chandler, "Historical Determinants of Managerial Hierarchies: A 
Response to Perrow" [1981}, in McGraw, ed., Essential Alfred Chandler, 460. For a critique 
see Charles S. Maier, "Accounting for the Achievements of Capitalism: Alfred Chandlers 
Business History," Journal of Modem History 65 (Dec. 1993): 771-782. "It is appropriate to 
ask," Maier wrote, "as a historian, whether the organizational forces Chandler adduces were 
in fact the critical ones for successful development, as he claims, or whether other impuls-
es-the state, the work force, entrepreneurial genius, or 'animal spirits'-might not have 
been. With respect to this question, I believe, a level of indeterminacy remains despite the 
vastness of the scholarly enterprise," 781. 
6 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., review of David Noble, America by Design, in Technology and 
Culture 19 (July 1978), 572. 
7 Chandler, Visible Hand, 11. 
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New technologies and burgeoning markets were necessary but not 
sufficient preconditions for the rise of the modern business enterprise. 
Even more important was the establishment of an administrative hier-
archy to coordinate the flow of resources through the firm. Lacking 
such a hierarchy, business leaders could never hope to realize the 
potential "economies of speed" that modem technology made possi-
ble.8 Organization, in short-even more than technology and mar-
kets-was the key to efficiency, longevity, and economic growth. With 
the publication of The Visible Hand, as one early reviewer posited, the 
organization chart found its historian. 9 
Chandler's focus on organizational innovation thrust into the spot-
light a group of historical agents who, prior to the publication of The 
Visible Hand, had only rarely been treated in much detail. The pivotal 
fignres in the making of the modem business enterprise, Chandler 
concluded, included not only legendary business leaders such as 
Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, but also the army of for-
gotten middle managers whom the Carnegies and the Rockefellers 
relied on to administer their firms. Though middle managers had been 
often overlooked in older accounts, Chandler credited them with a 
more central role in the operation of the American economy than the 
oft-discussed inventors, empire builders, and financiers. 10 
Taken together, technologically based organizational innovations 
hastened a "managerial revolution" that transformed the American 
economy in the decades between 1840 and 1920. At the core of this 
revolution were the technologically sophisticated, capital-intensive 
firms that have come to be known as big business. In addition to fuel-
ing economic growth, these firms pioneered industrial research and 
development, equipped the American military during the Second 
World War and the subsequent cold war era, and built the hardware for 
the atomic energy and space programsn Only occasionally did 
Chandler pause in The Visible Hand to spell out the broader social and 
cultural implications of the managerial revolution, possibly because he 
8 Chandler's preoccupation with the administrative coordination of tangible resources is 
worth underscoring, given the significance that certain economic historians have assigned to 
informational economies as the key element in the functioning of the modern business enter-
prise. Whatever the merits of this position, it is quite distinct from, and incompatible with, 
Chandler's position in The Visible Hand. Peter Temin, Kintroduction," in Temin, ed., Inside 
the Black Box; Historical Perspectives on the Use of Irifonrwtion {Chicago, Ill., 1991), 2. 
9 H. V. Nelles, review of The Visible Hand, Labour/Le Travailleur4 (Winter 1979): 272. 
10 Chandler, Visible Hand, 491. 
11 Ibid., 483. 
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considered them self-evide9't: There can be little question, however, 
that he understood this revolution to be a major event in world histo-
ry, with far-reaching implications for virtually every phase of American 
life. Not even the urban revolution of the eleventh to the thirteenth 
centuries that created the first modem market economies, he observed 
matter-of-factly, marked a more radical break with the past. 12 
Chandler grqunded his account of the managerial revolution in a 
three-stage model of economic development. In the first stage 
(1790-1840), the market was the primary mechanism for the produc-
tion and distribution of goods and services and the modern business 
enterprise remained unknown. In the second stage (1840--1880), the 
modern business enterprise emerged to coordinate the epochal 
changes in transportation and communication set in motion by the 
steam railroad, the electric telegraph, and the widespread utilization of 
anthracite coal. In the third stage (1880-1920), the completion of the 
railroad and telegraph network hastened the emergence of the modern 
industrial enterprise. 
By the First World War, the managerial revolution was complete. 
During the 1920s, however, still another round of organizational inno-
vation began, spurred by the planned administrative decentralization 
at Du Pont and General Motors. Chandler had previously analyzed 
these organizational innovations in Strategy and Structure, a landmark 
study published in 1962 of the adoption of the multidivisional form of 
business organization at Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil, and 
Sears.13 While some readers found Chandler's decision to downplay 
this organizational innovation in The Visible Hand hard to explain, it 
was consistent with his narrative design. Had Chandler featured mul-
tidivisionalism in The Visible Hand, he would have risked diverting the 
reader's attention from the even more fundamental organizational 
innovations in American business he believed to have taken place in 
the period between the 1840s and the 1910s.14 
The first stage of Chandler's model of economic development was 
an economic ancien regime. In the half century behveen 1790 and 
1840, Chandler wrote, no new economic institutions were established 
12 Alfred D, Chandler, Jr., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism" Business 
llisto1Jj Review 58 (Winter 1984): 474. ' 
. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the 
American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). 
14 An analogous logic helps explain why Chandler devoted so little attention in The 
Visibl~ Hand to the concept of the indushial revolution. liad he given this concept more 
attention, it would have risked diverting his readers' attention from the managerial revolution 
that waB his primary concern. 
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and no revolution in business methods occurred.15 Chandler readily 
conceded that the late-eighteenth-century British industrial revolution 
spurred demand for American agricultural staples such as cotton and 
wheat, and that the establishment of a strengthened central govern-
ment under the Constitution of 1787 hastened the creation of a nation-
al economy. He denied, however, that these events had fundamental 
consequences for the organizational structure of the firm. The central 
theme in American business history in the early republic, Chandler 
wrote, was the increasing functional specialization made possible by 
market expansion.16 Prior to the coming of the railroad and telegraph, 
business activity continued to be dominated by the same single-unit 
enterprises that had flourished since the Middle Ages. Transportation 
and communication were simply too slow, irregular, and uncertain to 
make possible the high-volume throughput that was a necessary pre-
condition for the emergence of the modern business enterprise.17 By 
the end of the first stage of Chandler's model in 1840, functional spe-
cialization had advanced so far that American society had become a 
"believable illustration" of the "untrammeled market economy'' that 
political economist Adam Smith had so eloquently described in the 
The Wealth ofNationsrn 
During the second stage of Chandler's model (1840-1880), the 
balance between the Smithian market and the Chandlerian firm was 
decisively transformed by a triad of epochal technological advances: 
the railroad, the telegraph, and the widespread utilization of anthracite 
coal. Though this stage coincided with the American Civil War, 
Chandler devoted little attention to the possible implications of the 
war upon economic development. Far more consequential was the 
expansion of the market hastened by the completion of the national 
transportation and communication netw-ork. There was no theoretical 
reason, Chandler declared, why these technological advances neces-
sarily had to precede the establishment of the modern multiunit busi-
ness enterprise.19 In Europe, for example, market expansion rather 
than technological advance had served as a catalyst for organizational 
innovation. In the United States, however, the market in the pre-rail-
road era was simply too geographically dispersed to provide business 
m Chandler, Visible Hand, 16, 49. 
16 Ibid., 48. 
17 Ibid., 84. 
18 Ibid., 28. 
19 Ibid., 49. 
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leaders with the necessaiy i).Ppetus to expand the scale of their opera-
tions beyond the single-unit fmn. 
The third, final, and most transformative stage of Chandler's 
model of American economic development began around 1880, with 
the integration of mass production an~ mass distribution in the mod-
em industrial enterprise. Firms such as American Tobacco, Armour, 
McCormick Reaper, and Singer Sewing Machine integrated vertically, 
hastening organizational innovation in middle management. Other 
firms, including Standard Oil, General Electric, United States Rubber, 
and Du Pont integrated horizontally, encouraging organizational inno-
vation in top management. Many firms went through a similar meta-
morphosis, which began with horizontal combination and legal cen-
tralization and ended with vertical integration and administrative coor-
dination. The consolidation process culminated with the great merger 
movement of the late 1890s and early 1900s that led to the creation of 
industrial giants such as U.S. Steel. Government efforts to slow the 
emergence of big business-such as the passage of antitrust legisla-
tion-worked, paradoxically, to hasten its rise. From the perspective 
of a business leader in 1840, the sudden emergence during the follow-
ing decades of these giant firms was nothing short of astonishing. And 
with good reason. From the business leader's standpoint, the 
Americao economy in 1840 had more in common with the world of a 
fifteenth-centuiy Italiao merchaot than it would with the world that 
the business leader's graodchildren took for granted in 1917-'° The 
impetus for all of this organizational activity, Chandler contended, was 
"easy to explain": it was the "rational economic response" to the com-
pletion of the railroad aod telegraph networks and the perfection of 
their operational techniques.21 
Chandler's account of the managerial revolution was resoltitely 
unsentimental. Prior to 1940, he freely conceded, these chaoges 
almost certainly had been opposed by a majority of the American peo-
ple. Furthermore, he well lmew that, by investing with great power a 
class of economic agents who were accountable neither to investors 
nor the electorate, this revolution posed a major challenge for 
American democratic ideals. Still, he regarded its triumph as largely 
inevitable, even in countries where opposition to it had been even 
more widespread than in the United States.22 The rise of the modem 
20 Ibid., 455. 
21 Chandler, "Comparative Business History," 17. 
22 Chandler, Visible Hand, 497-500. 
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business enterprise, Chandler explained, was an organizational 
response to fundamental technological advances in mass production 
and mass distribution made possible by the utilization of new sources 
of energy such as electricity and the increasing application to industri-
al technology of scientific lmowledge grounded in recent advances in 
chemistiy and physics. As such, it was little affected by public policy, 
capital markets, or entrepreneurial talents.23 The modem business 
enterprise, in short, was the product not only of a congeries of contin-
gent events specific to the United States, but also, and more funda-
mentally, of a basic transformation in the relationship between human-
ity and the environment. In this way, as one early reviewer percep-
tively observed, Chandler's explanatoiy scheme was grounded in a 
materialist, "technologically determinist" analysis of institutional 
change. 24 
• • • 
Historians have sometimes expressed surprise that Chandler focused 
exclusively in The Visible Hand on changes that occurred within the 
firm. This surprise is somewhat puzzling, since Chandler was quite 
explicit about the parameters of his study. The purpose of The Visible 
Hand, Chandler explained in his introduction, was to write a histoiy of 
the internal dynamics of the modem business enterprise, and to deal 
with broad political, demographic, and social developments only as 
they impinged directly on the ways in which the enterprise carried out 
the processes of production and distribution.25 In keeping with this 
deliberately narrow focus, Chandler defined business histoiy as a 
"small subfield of economic histoiy" and stressed that his work had left 
unexplored a whole range of contextualist issues that other historians 
would do well to consider. 26 
In the years since the publication of The Visible Hand, Chandler 
has remained true to this internalist agenda. The theme of Scale and 
Scope (1990), as he explained in the introduction to this most recent 
major work, was the "internal history" of a central institution in man-
agerial capitalism, rather than the broader impact of the managerial 
23 Ibid., 376. See also Chandler, "Government Versus Business: An American 
Phenomenon" [1979], in McGraw, ed., Essential Alfred Chandler, 425-431. 
24 Nelles, review of Visible Hand, 272. 
25 Chandler, Visible Hand, 6. 
25 Chandler, "Comparative Business History," 3. 
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enterprise on the polity or the society.21 In one respect Ch di 
ro d hi t · ·11 , an er nar-
t' we. hs op1c sti further, since he now defined the central institu-
10~ in t e American economy to be not ~he business enterprise-the 
su 1ect of The Visible Hand-but rather the indu tr"al t . 
and n all ' ' s I en erpnse 
, more speciI~c y, those enterprises that specialized in the , 
facture ft hn 1 . all manu-
. o ec o ogic y sophisticated goods such as chemical I 
tncal machinery, and automobiles.28 For Chandler, the history :f ;~~: 
:n ~mencan ente:rprise thus became more or less synonymous with 
the story of the leading firms in the most capital-intensive sectors of 
tio: e~on~my. R~rely before had any historian devoted so much atten-
. o t is particular kind of economic activity or assumed it to be 
qmte so essential to the making of the modem United St t 
Chandler's characterization of American business i: e~. l and S~"Pe built on arguments he advanced in The Visible Hand. c;,;:ou h ~ andler broadened his canvas to embrace Great Britain a~d 
ermany as well as the United States and expanded hi· h I include th . d , s c rono ogy to 
e peno after 1917, he remained highly impressed with the 
emergence m the United States during the final decades of th . 
teenth c tury f h l e mne-
d d
enfu 0 t e arge-scale, capital intensive, technolomcally 
a vance m The P ·nc· al h"f f b" k · ri 1P s 1 t o perspective between these two 
war s can be found in the greater significance in the latter that h 
accorded creative entrepreneurship, cultural traditio d e 
ment I ti · h n, an govern-
. d re~u a on m s aping the organizational dynamics of the modern 
17 .ust~ enterprise. The key to business success, Chandler now 
c aime ' was not merely the administrative coordination of the flow of 
resources through the firm by a team of . ddl 1 . h d b m1 e managers-as for 
examp e, it a een in The Visible Hand. Rather it was the "th, 
prong d" · b ' ree-
. e investment y creative entrepreneurs in production di t ·b-
ution and manage t Th ' s n 
. . ' men . e creation of these organizational ca abil 
ities, Chandler posited, was the "central dynamic" of mod . dp .-
al capitalism.29 em m ustrt-
27 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. Scale and Seo e· Th Dy (Cambridge Mass 1990) 13 1' th P · e namics of Industrial Capitalism ' ·• , · n e second, corr ct d dT Ch di 
slightly by substituting the lndefin·t , tl d fl ~ e e 1 wn, an er modHled his claim 
d 
• 11eJ.or le ein1tearti I M ·-1 
conten ed, was "a» central institution . . c ~· . anagenw. enterprise, he now 
institution, as he had formerly contende~n ;~nagenal capitalism, rather than "the" central 
observed, in explaining his decision whi~ h e p7se taught me a .good lesson"-Chandler "Don'~ use 'the' when you can use'~.'" Alfred ~a ~6"dJ to leamm.g of Hughes's critique: 
1996, m author's possession · an er, Jr., to Richard R. John, 31 Oct. 
~ . 
Chandler, Scale and Scope 14. 
29 Ibid., 596. ' 
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• • • 
It has long been recognized that Chandler's preoccupation with the 
history of large-scale enterprise in the United States owed something 
to his personal background. Chandler's patrician upbringing, his first-
hand familiarity with prominent business leaders, and his service dur-
ing the Second World War as a naval officer responsible for analyzing 
photographs of U.S. bomber runs over Germany and landing sites for 
the proposed American invasion of Japan, combined in complex ways 
to fix his attention on the role of organizational innovation in econom-
ic development.30 So, too, did the years Chandler spent in the 1950s 
editing the wartime papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower." Also influen-
tial was Chandler's frequent interaction during the 1970s and 1980s 
with specialists in organizational innovation at the IIarvard Business 
School, where he taught during the years he completed The Visible 
Hand and Scale and Scope. Indeed, Chandler himself has repeatedly 
contended that he could not have completed either work in any other 
setting. 
Yet the single most important cultural influence upon Chandler's 
general outlook was almost certainly the epochal reorientation in intel-
lectual assumptions about the relationship of the United States to the 
rest of the world that was brought about by the Second World War. In 
1941, one year after Chandler graduated from college and joined the 
navy, Time magazine publisher Henry Luce predicted the dawning of 
an "American Century," during which the United States would hasten 
the global spread of capitalism and democracy. During the next five 
years, Chandler participated in the greatest military mobilization in the 
history of the world. The experience heightened Chandler's respect 
for the role of American business-and, in particular, big business-in 
creating the unprecedented arsenal that the allied military forces 
relied on to triumph over Germany and Japan and to save Great Britain 
from possible defeat. 'What Rome was to the ancient world," pre-
dicted the respected journalist Walter Lippmann at war's end in 1945, 
"and what Great Britain has been to the modern world, America is to 
be to the world of tomorrow."32 Chandler spent his formative years in 
an environment shaped by the American-centric world view that 
30 McGraw, "Intellectual Odyssey," 4-5. 
31 Chandler, with Stephen E. Ambrose, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: 
The War Years, vols. 1-5 (Baltimore, Md., 1970). 
32 Cited in James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 
(New York, 1996), 7-8. 
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Lippmann described, and bl'gan his graduate education at precisely 
the moment when the United States was poised to take its place as a 
key player on the world stage. 
Such a proud and cosmopolitan perspective, shaped by the 
promise of Luce's dawning "American Century," has informed most of 
Chandler's major writings and was particularly conspicuous in Scale 
and Scope. ChanQ.ler's oeuvre, one historian has recently written, fur-
nished an "imposing historiographical testimony to a civilization con-
vinced that it created and controlled unprecedented economic 
progress."33 Not even the economic reverses that American business 
has confronted since 1970 have dimmed Chandler's conviction that the 
United States was the principal "seedbed" of the managerial revolution 
and a major source of organizational innovation for business leaders in 
Great Britain, Europe, Japan, and other nations of the industrial 
world.34 While it would be an oversimplification to dismiss Chandler 
as an apologist for big business, neither The Visible Hand nor Scale and 
Scope was value-neutral in its import. By tracing American economic 
development to technological advances rooted in the natural world,' 
The Visible Hand helped to legitimize big business as a feature of 
American life. Scale and Scope, similarly, can be read as a cautionary 
tale of how Great Britain-the first industrial nation-was confronted 
during the Second World War with a major challenge to its political 
survival because its leaders failed to invest adequately in its industrial 
base. 
• • • 
Chandler's personal background was but one of the factors that helped 
shape the writing of The Visible Harui. No less important was the pre-
vailing historiographical tradition that he reacted against. When 
Chandler began writing business history in the 1950s, the principal 
debate in American business history concerned the moral evaluation of 
American business leaders. Were they malevolent "robber barons," as 
Matthew Josephson contended, or praiseworthy "industrial states-
man,'' as Allan Nevins claimed? Chandler shared Josephson's and 
Nevins's commitment to business biography. In addition to writing 
33 Maier, "Accounting for the Achievements of Capitalism," 782. 
34 Chandler did not, however, claim that organizational innovations invariably originat-
ed in the United States. For example, in Scale and Scape he credited managers at Siemens, 
a Gennan firm, with having introduced the multidivisional fonn prior to their counterparts 
at DuPont and General Motors. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 469-471, 544. 
' 
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biographical studies of the business analyst Henry Varnum Poor and 
the industrialist Pierre Du Pont, he researched the historical sections 
of Alfred P. Sloan's My Years with General Motors. 35 Yet he had scant 
patience with the robber baron-industrial statesman dichotomy. The 
business enterprise loomed too large in the American past, he 
believed, for its history to be reduced to a morality play. "What could 
be less likely to produce useful generalizations,'' he later reminisced, 
"than a debate over vaguely defined moral issues based on unexamined 
ideological assumptions and presuppositions?"36 
Chandler was hardly the first business historian to devise a stage 
model of American economic development. His model, however, dif-
fered in major respects from those of earlier historians. Unlike N. S. 
B. Gras-who, as the first individual ever to hold a chair in business 
history, did much to establish the boundaries of the field-Chandler 
traced the beginnings of big business to the railroad, rather than to the 
sedentary merchants who, in the pre-railroad era, dominated overseas 
trade.37 To buttress his point, Chandler rejected George Rogers 
Taylor's thesis that the transportation revolution began with the canal 
boom in the years immediately following the War of 1812, several 
decades prior to the coming of the steam railroad. In addition, he chal-
lenged Robert G. Albion's claim that the communication revolution 
began with various improvements in the late eighteenth century, more 
than half a century before the commercialization of the electric tele-
graph.38 
Equally innovative was Chandler's treatment of the American 
industrial revolution. Before the publication of The Visible Hand, most 
35 Chandler, Henry Varnum Poor: Business Editor, Analyst, and Reformer (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1956); idem, with Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the Modem 
Corporation (New York, 1971); Alfred P. Sloan, My Years wtth General Motors (Garden Ci~ 
N.J., 1964). On Chandler's involvement with Sloan's memoir, see McGraw; ed., Essential 
Alfred Chandler, 156-157. ,, " 
36 Chandler, "Comparative Business History, 7. See also Glenn Porter, Technology 
and Business in the American Economy," in Joseph R. Frese and Jacob Judd, An Emerging 
Independent American Economy, 1815-1875 (Tarrytown, N.J.,1980), 1-23. 
37 N. S. B. Gras and Henrietta Larson, Casebook in American Business History (New 
York, 1939), 6. 
36 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York, 1951); 
Robert G. Albion, "The Communication Revolution," American Historical Review 37 (July 
1932): 718--720. See also Harry N. Scheiber and Stephen Salsbury, "R_eflections of Georg~ 
Rogers Taylor's The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860: A 'l\ve~ty-F1,;e Year Retrospe~t, 
Business History Review 51 (Spring 1979): 79-89; Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation 
Revolution and American Law: Constitutionalism and Public Policy,» Transportation and the 
Early Nation (Indianapolis, Ind., 1982), 1-29; and Richard R. John, "American Historians 
and the Concept of the Communications Revolution," in Information Acumen: The 
Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modern Business, ed. Llsa Bud-Frierman (London, 
1994), 98-110. 
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business historians had traced the origins of the industrial revolution in 
the United States to the establishment in New England during the 
1800s and 1810s of large-scale, water-powered textile mills filled with 
machinery made mostly of wood and leather. These historians, in tnm, 
were reacting against the social historian Charles Beard, who in the 
1920s had linked the triumph of industrialism with the Union victory 
in the Civil War. Chandler's account was quite different. The begin-
nings of the industrial revolution in the United States, he declared-in 
an article that appeared in 1972, shortly before the publication of The 
Visible Hand-could be found neither in the 1800s and the 1810s, nor 
in the Civil War. Rather, its origins dated to the 1830s and 1840s, fol-
lowing the opening of the anthracite coal fields of eastern 
Pennsylvania. Anthracite coal was the first fossil fuel to be widely used 
in the United States and, Chandler contended, quickly and irrevocably 
replaced water, wood, and charcoal as a major power source. In addi-
tion, it greatly facilitated the manufacture of iron, metal machinery, 
and metal products of all kinds, since the mass production of these 
goods· depended on easy access to a reliable, cheap, and high-intensity 
energy source. Since alternative sources of coal soon became available, 
Chandler doubted that the opening of the Pennsylvania fields was, like 
the coming of the railroad and the telegraph, a necessary precondition 
for American economic development. Yet he regarded it as an impor-
tant contingent event that had a major impact on American economic 
history. 39 
Though Chandler had, in his 1972 article, highlighted the impor-
tance of the American industrial revolution, in The Visible Hand he 
accorded the concept little role in either his stage model or his 
explanatory scheme. From Chandler's standpoint, coal, iron, and 
steam power were necessary but not sufficient preconditions for the 
managerial revolution that was his major concern. In Great Britain, 
after all, an industrial revolution had taken place, beginning in the late 
eighteenth century, without hastening a managerial revolution that was 
in any way comparable to the managerial revolution that occurred in 
the mid-nineteenth-century United States. Interestingly, Chandler 
used the industrial revolution concept sparingly in The Visible Hand; 
the phrase itself appeared only once in the index, in reference to devel-
opments in eighteenth-century Great Britain.40 By deploying the con-
39 Chandler, "Anthracite Coal and the Beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the 
United States" [1972], in McGraw, ed., Essential Alfred Chandler, 307--342. 
40 Chandler, Visible Hand, 19. 
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cept in this carefully delimited way, Chandler minimized the possibili-
ty that readers might exaggerate the significance of either the early-
nineteenth-century New England textile industry or the transportation 
and communications revolutions that antedated the railroad and tele-
graph. In addition, this decision enabled him to hint, if only implicit-
ly, at a theme that he would later develop in Scale and Scope-name-
ly, that in the United States, but not Great Britain, the managerial rev-
olution followed the industrial revolution with little pause or delay. 
Just as Chandler's analysis of industrialism broke with convention, 
so, too, did his account of the late nineteenth-century merger move-
ment. Once again, Chandler reinterpreted a familiar sequence of 
events in an original way. Most previous scholars had assumed the 
merger movement to be economically inefficient and ethically suspect. 
Chandler, in contrast, treated it as an appropriate response to the orga-
nizational opportunities made possible by market expansion and tech-
nological advance. 
Chandler's conviction that technological advance and organiza-
tional innovation could go together set apart his approach to econom-
ic development from that of political economists such as Thorstein 
Veblen. According to Veblen, business leaders intent on maximizing 
profits routinely stifled technological advances pioneered by engi-
neers. Chandler, in contrast, highlighted the interdependence of sci-
ence, technology, and business. In Chandler's account, engineers like 
Alfred P. Sloan found corporate America congenial, while business 
leaders like Theodore N. Vail made industrial research a linchpin of 
business strategy. Chandler's work, as economic historian Paul 
Uselding observed, laid to rest Veblen's idea that the cultures of sci-
ence and business were necessarily antithetical as well as the related 
idea that business objectives must invariably be opposed to the attain-
ment of the material goals of society.41 
Chandler's outlook owed a good deal to his well-known impatience 
with hypothetical alternatives, or what economic historians have 
termed counterfactuals. Throughout his career, he has been more 
interested in what did happen than in what might have taken place had 
circumstances somehow been different. He had great respect, as one 
early reviewer perceptively noted, for "what we may call the social real-
ity principle."42 That some alternative scenario might have been 
41 Paul Uselding, "Business History and the History of Technology," Business History 
Review 54 (Winter 1980): 445. 
42 Robert D. Cuff, "From Market to Manager" [review of The Vfaible Hand], Canadian 
Review of American Studies 10 (Spring 1979): 53. 
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preferable was, for Chandler, as it most emphatically was not for 
Veblen, an idle question. 
Among the most innovative features of The Visible Hand was 
Chandler's rejection of the well-established notion that American eco-
n~mic. development was best measured against a British norm. 
H1stonans havJ traditionally taken it for granted that the industrial rev-
olu~on began in" Great Britain and was only later imported into the 
Umted States. There was one leader, Britain," declared David s. 
Landes in his classic study of the technological change of Western 
Europe, "and all the rest were pursuers."43 Chandler never challenged 
this convention outright. Instead, he subtly subverted it by highlight-
ing the even greater significance of the managerial revolution that 
began around 1840 in the United States, and which, in Europe, Landes 
termed the "second wind." In the managerial realm, the United States, 
rather than Great Britain, led the way. The United States Chandler 
explained in Scale and Scope-expanding on a metaphor that he had 
mtrod~ced in. The Visible Hand-was the "seedbed" of the organiza-
tional mnovations, that, by the twentieth century, had spread from the 
Umted States to Germany, Great Britain, and the rest of the industri-
alized world.44 From such a standpoint, the problem to be explained 
was no lo~ger the time-lag in the transfer of industrial technology from 
Great Bntam to the United States. Rather, it was the reluctance of 
British business leaders to adopt the organizational innovations that 
had already gained wide acceptance in the United States.45 
43 
David.s. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Chllnge and Industrial 
Development m Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge 1969) 538 44 Chandler, Visible Hand_ 498 ' ' · 
45 
By considerin~ British' eco~omic development from the standpoint of the United Stat~~, Chandl~r pro".1-ded a new perspective on the well lmown reluctance of British uni-
ven:1ties to t:run. en?111eers and other technical professionals. This reluctance, Chandler bos~ted, was institutional rather than cultural. That is, it sprang from the failure of British 
us1ness leaders to call forth the engineering talent necessary for the proper administration ~f ~~eh m~_dem business enterprise, rather than from the supposed anti-technological bent of 
ntis e 1tes. Had such a demand existed, Chandler predicted, even u er-class uths 
would h~ve flocked .to t~chnical fields. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "Th!PGrowth :r the 
Transnational Industnal Firm in the United States and the U "t d Ki d . AC · A l · •• E . Ill e ng om. omparatlve 
nays1s, conomic History Review 33 (Aug 1980)· 409--410 Q th' th l ,, D ·d c M " . · · · n is eme, see a so lilSO 
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• • • 
The influence of The Visible Hand on business and economic histori-
ans would be hard to exaggerate. Few areas of historical inquiry have 
been so decisively shaped by the work of a single scholar. Among busi-
ness historians, reported a popular journalist in 1990, "B.C." has 
become synonymous with "before Chandler."'° During the past few 
years, reflected business historian and former Chandler student Glenn 
Porter in 1992, Chandler's writings virtually became business history. 
"No other historian," Porter added, "has ever exercised such a strong 
influence" over the field: "Virtually every work now written on the his-
tory of modem, large-scale enterprise must begin by placing itself 
within the Chandlerian analytical framework."47 Chandler's ideas 
shaped a leading business history casebook (which Chandler co-
authored), two popular business history texts, a business history read-
er, and several general accounts of the role of business in American 
life.48 Chandler's ideas have also been frequently discussed by eco-
nomic historians, a major tribute to their explanatory power, since his 
comparative case study approach to economic deVelopment has for the 
past few decades been out of favor among the leading practitioners in 
this field. 49 Even business and economic historians who challenged 
Chandler's approach found themselves impressed by the influence of 
his ideas. The Visible Hand, declared the non-Chandlerian economic 
historian Gavin Wright in 1986, has been perhaps the "most influential 
46 
"Corporate Giants: The Origin of the Species," Business Week (9 July 1990): 12. 
47 Glenn Porter, The Rise of Big Business, 1860-1920 (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1992), 
128. 
48 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Thomas K. McGraw, and Richard S. Tedlow, Management 
Past and Present (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1996); Mansel G. Blackford and K. Ailltin Kerr, Business 
Enterprise in American History (Boston, Mass.,1990); C. Joseph Pusateri, A History of 
American Business (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1984); Richard S. Tedlow and Richard R. John, 
eds., Managing Big Business: Essays from the Business History Review (Boston, Mass., 
1986); Maury Klein, The Flowering of the Third America: The Making of an Organizational 
Society, 1850-1920 (Chicago, Ill., 1993); Stuart Bruchey, Enterprise: The Dynamic Economy 
of a Free People (Cambridge, Mass., 1990); Robert Sobel and David B. Sicilia, The 
Entrepreneurs: An American Adventure (Boston, Mass., 1986); James Oliver Robertson, 
America's Business (New York, 1985); Harold A. Livesay, American Made: Men Who Shaped 
the American Economy (Boston, Mass., 1979); and Porter, Rise of Big Business. 
49 Between 1978 and 1994, The Visible Hand was cited in the Journal of Economic 
History 42 times. This exceeded the 28 cites for Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman's 
Time on the Cross (1974), a much discussed econometric study of slavery that had been writ-
ten by two of the leaders of the new economic history. During the same period, Thomas C. 
Cochran's Frontiers of Change (1981), a major study of early industrialism, was cited 3 times, 
while Galambos's landmark 1970 Business History Review essay on the organizational syn-
thesis was not cited at all. These totals are derived from the CD-ROM version of the Arts 
and Humanities Citation Index. 
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book in American business ~d economic history" to have been pub-
lished during the past decaBe.50 "Chandler's vision"-conceded busi-
ness historian and Chandler critic John N. Ingham in 1991-"has cap-
tivated an entire generation ofhistorians."51 Had Chandler never lived, 
business history would probably have eventnally moved beyond the 
robber baron-industrial statesman debate. But scholars today would 
almost certainly know far less about the strategy, stmctnre, and orga-
nizational dynamics of the modern business enterprise. 
Perhaps the best barometer of the magnitude of Chandler's 
achievement has been the extent to which the tag phrase 
"Chandlerian" has joined Marxian, Weberian, and Schumpeterian as a 
convenient shorthand for an entire tradition of scholarship. 
Significantly, the shorthand has been adopted not only by Chandler's 
champions, but also by his critics, a sure sign that Chandler's ideas have 
proved hard to dismiss. Another measure of Chandler's influence is 
the propensity of book reviewers to treat the Chandlerian framework 
as the template against which every new work in business history must 
be judged. One book reviewer in the Business History Review made 
this point particularly well. The book in question, the reviewer noted, 
with evident surprise, made no reference to Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., or 
to other modem historians of business.52 For the past dozen or so 
years, few criticisms of a new monograph in business history have 
seemed less controversial, or more to-the-point. 
The Visible Hand influenced business history in a number of ways. 
More than any other single work, it dispelled the nagging fear that the 
intensive, time-consuming, and often tedious study of internally gen-
erated business records-the raison d'etre for business history as a spe-
cialized area of inquiry ever since the establishment of the first profes-
sorship in the field in 1927-would never yield anything more than a 
steady stream of fact-studded monographs on isolated and seemingly 
unrelated topics.53 With the publication of The Visible Hand, this sus-
picion was laid to rest. Chandler always stressed the interdependence 
of theory and empiricism; in The Visible Hand, he showed how they 
could be successfully combined. Indeed, one suspects that much of 
the appeal of Chandler's approach for business historians can be found 
50 Gavin Wright, "Regulation in America: The Human Touch," Reviews in American 
Histo1JI 14 (June 1986): 166. 
5 John N. Ingham, Making Iron and Steel.· Independent Mills in Pittsburgh, 1820-1920 
(Columbus, Ohio, 1991), 3, 
52 Business History Review 64 (Autumn 1990): 531. 
53 On the emergence of business history as a distinct field, see Louis Galambos, 
American Business History (Washington, D.C., 1967). 
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in its happy marriage of broad-brush generalization and pointillist 
detail. Though The Visible Hand lacked the descriptive richness of 
industrial community studies such as Anthony F. C. Wallace's 
Rockdale, it was firmly rooted in the existing scholarship in the field, 
attentive to chronology, individuals, and events, and committed to set-
ting the record straight-the basic responsibility, Chandler declared in 
his introduction, of the historian's craft.54 Brirnrning with citations to 
virtually every major work in American business history, it did more to 
legitimize business history as a scholarly field than a score of even the 
best-crafted company histories. 
The Visible Hand has been particularly influential in shaping the 
business and economic historians' intellectual agenda. Focused as it 
was on the largest enterprises in the most capital-intensive sectors of 
the economy, it encouraged business and economic historians to treat 
these firms and industries as their primary subject. In the process, it 
pushed to the margins of inquiry a host of other topics, including small 
business, government-business relations, and the role of business in 
American life. 
Following the publication of The Visible Hand, non-Chandlerian 
approaches to the history of American business suddenly came to seem 
out-of-date. It pointedly revealed, as administrative historian Robert 
D. Cuff explained in 1979, the intellectual inadequacy of the "culture-
personality axis" that many business historians had formerly relied on 
to make sense of the past. 55 This was true even though The Visible 
Hand focused on the organizational evolution of the modem business 
enterprise, which, Chandler freely conceded, was a decidedly limited 
theme. Also eclipsed, at least temporarily, was the more capacious, 
"geo-cultural" approach to business history favored by Thomas C. 
Cochran, a business historian whose contribution to the field was 
matched only by Chandler's. The contrast between Cochran and 
Chandler was marked. For Cochran, culture and geography-or, what 
one today might call the environment-were the essential elements in 
any adequate account of the role of business in American life. For 
Chandler, in contrast, culture and geography were best treated as 
background factors, or "givens," that business historians could safely 
leave for others to explore.55 With the publication of The Visible Hand, 
Chandler's de-emphasis of culture and geography came close to 
54 Chandler, Visible Hand, 6. 
55 Cuff, "From Market to Manager," 52. 
50 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry" 
[1959], in McCraw, ed., Essential Alfred Chandler, 41. 
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becoming an intellectual orihodoxy, Though Chandler's approach has 
not gone unchallenged, it has shaped the outlook of many business and 
economic historians from 1977 to the present. 
Equally influential has been Chandler's commitment to social sci-
ence methbd" The Visible Hand was the product of a tradition of his-
torical writing that aspired to frame plausible, middle-level generaliza-
tions about large-scale processes such as organizational innovation. 
Characteristically, The Visible Hand opened not with a dramatic se! 
piece, but, rather, with a series of general propositions. By framing his 
narrative in this way, Chandler provided a veritable how-to guide for 
historians interested in emulating his example. 
Particularly important in shaping Chandler's method was his expo-
sure in graduate school to Talcott Parsons, a sociologist who had devel-
oped a structuralist-functionalist approach to the study of institutional 
change. Parsons, Chandler reminisced, exerted a far greater influence 
on his intellectual assumptions than all the historians under whom he 
studied in graduate schooL In particular, Chandler credited Parsons 
with instilling in him the notion that carefully framed comparisons 
could provide social scientists such as himself with a technique that was 
roughly analogous to the controlled experiment in the physical and nat-
ural_ sciences.57 Comparative institutional history, Chandler explained, 
in a programmatic essay that he published six years before The Visible 
Hand, provided business historians with a major intellectual heritage 
that opened a dialogue with a galaxy of renowned, institutionally mind-
ed social theorists that included Parsons, Joseph Schumpeter, and Max 
Weber,
58 It was a heritage and a dialogue that The Visible Hand has 
done much to promote. 
The cornerstone of Chandler's method was his decision to apply 
'Parsons' structuralist-functionalist method to the study of business 
behavior, This decision had the disadvantage of depriving Chandler's 
account of many of the features that have traditionally made historical 
writing compelling, Institutional business history, Chandler freely con-
ceded, might well be less lively, less dramatic, and less personal than 
more traditional historical narratives of business leaders and enterpris-
e" But it had the compensating advantage of enabling business histo-
57 
Chandler, "Comparative Business History," 11. For a related discussion-which 
chronicles, and provides a notably sympathetic account of, historians' longstanding preoccu-
pation \.vith models drawn from natural science-see Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and 
Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York, 1994). 
58 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "Business History as Institutional History" [1971], in 
Mccraw, ed., Essential Alfred Chandler, 305. 
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rians to make unique contributions that could broaden knowledge and 
understanding of the "industrial, urban, technologically driven, ~od­
em world,"59 By operating at such a relatively high level of abstraction, 
Chandler found it possible to frame credible generalizations that tra~­
scended the limitations of time and space, and, in so domg, to give his 
analysis a good deal of explanatory power, , , 
Chandler's method culminated in his creat10n of a sweepmg narra-
, tive of American economic development. Seven years prior to the 
publication of The Visible Hand, Chandler's collaborator Louis 
Galarnbos drew attention in an influential review essay to the emerg-
ing "organizational synthesis" of American history.60 Such a synthesis, 
Galambos posited, revolved around the organizational evolution of 
large-scale institutions, rather than the ebb and flow of liberal reform 
Twentieth-century America's "rendezvous," Galambos provocativ~ly 
declared, had been "not with the liberal's good society It was with 
bureaucracy,"" Galambos had worked closely with Chandler and at 
the time was broadly sympathetic to Chandler's general approach, It 
was, thus, hardly surprising that Galambos highlighted the centrality to 
the organizational synthesis of the rise of the modem business enter-
prise, The emergence of this new institution, Galambos decl~r:d~ 
and, more broadly, of giant, complex organ1zati~ns-';as th:
62 
smg~e 
most important phenomenon in modem Amencan history. This 
phenomenon had preoccupied Chandler since 195,9', when ,he p,ub-
lished a landmark essay on "The Beginnings of Big Busmess m 
American Industry" in Business History Review, In The Visible Hand 
he provided a fully documented, narrative account of this epic theme, 
Just as Chandler deserves to be remembered as a founder of the 
organizational school of American historians, so The Visible Hand 
should be recognized as one of its crowning achievements. Pnor to 
1977, the organizational interpretation of American history lacked a 
story line; with the publication of The Visibfo Hand, the orgamz~tional 
interpretation acquired a coherence lacking In Amencan labor history, 
the history of American technology, or several other related field" Its 
most important historiographical contributio~-ob~erv~d Al~n 
Brinkley, in a judicious review essay on recent American h1stoncal wnt-
59 Chandler, "Comparative Business History," 26. . . . . ,, 
Go Louis Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis 111 Amencan History, 
Business History Review 44 (Autumn 1970): 279-290. . . . ,, 
61 Galambos "Technology, Political Economy, and Profess10nahzation, 471. 
62 Louis cJambos, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880-1940: A 
Quantitative Study ill Social Change (Baltimore, Md., 1975), 3. 
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ing-was its careful delineation of the "essential differences" between 
the twentieth centmy and the centnries that had gone before. 63 
During a period when American historians were routinely derided for 
their inability to produce a synthetic narrative account of major transi-
tions in the Atjierican past, this was no small achievement. The great 
challenge of modern historical scholarship, declared Bernard Bailyn in 
1982, was the fashioning of "essential narratives," grounded in the rel-
evant specialized literature, dominated by a sense of movement 
through time, and organized around critical transitions from the past 
toward the present. Judged by this criterion, The Visible Hand met 
Bailyn's challenge to a greater extent than all but a handful of works.64 
With its publication, organizational historians acquired for the first 
time a compelling intellectual agenda, or what the French would call a 
problematique. 
• • • 
While the influence of The Visible Hand among business, economic, 
and organizational historians is indisputable, its importance for histori-
ans of the United States who are not specialists in these fields is hard-
er to gauge. Although The Visible Hand remains a staple of graduate 
student reading lists, and has served as a crib for countless lectures in 
undergraduate U.S. history surveys, its broader influence, even t.\:v'enty 
years after its publication, can by no means be taken for granted. It 
may well be, as Galambos declared in 1985, that Chandler helped 
make business history a net exporter of ideas to the rest of the profes-
sion. 6D And it is certainly conceivable, as historian of technology 
Thomas P. Hughes recently predicted, that, a century from now, the 
phenomenon Chandler described will be hailed as one of the most 
remarkable achievements of the t.\:v'entieth century. But there is reason 
to question Hughes's hopeful claim that The Visible Hand is not only 
the prevailing interpretation of the rise of modem management but 
also mainstream American history. 66 After all, it is not hard to find 
prominent historians who continue to write about the rise of big busi-
63 Brinkley, -"Writing the History of Contemporary America," 133. 
64 Bernard Bailyn, "The Challenge of Modern Historiography," American Historical 
Review 87 (Feb. 1982): 10. 
65 Louis Galambos, "'Editor's Introduction,» in Robert W. Garnet, The Telephone 
Enterprise: The Evolution of the Bell Systems Horizontal Structure, 1876---1909 (Baltimore, 
Md.,1985), xiv. 
66 Thomas Hughes, "Managerial Capitalism Beyond the Firm," Business History 
Review 64 (Winter 1990): 698---699. 
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ness in a decidedly non-Chandlerian way. One recent survey of U.S. 
history in the decades between 1880 and 1920, for example, said virtu-
ally nothing about the organizational innovations in mass production, 
mass distribution, and management that, for Chandler, loomed so large 
in the period.67 Equally oblivious to these innovations were major 
recent studies of Reconstruction and the late-nineteenth-century labor 
movement.68 Several historians have gone so far as to challenge the 
organizational interpretation outright. "To understand the twentieth 
century United States"-wrote Michael McGerr, in a recent essay-
"we need to go beyond our faith in the power of organizations to trans-
form people and culture.· The limited impact of corporations has left a 
heterogeneous society-less organized, less modem, less susceptible 
to change than we have assumed.''69 It is, thus, perhaps not quite so 
surprising that one current textbook persists in dramatizing the rise of 
big business as a struggle between robber barons and industrial states-
man, precisely the duality that Chandler had hoped in The Visible 
Hand to transcend.70 
It has long been commonplace for historians to subject the most 
truly seminal works to detailed, line-by-line scrutiny. Measured by this 
criterion, The Visible Hand has still to take its place as one of the cen-
tral works in American historiography. Even the venerable frontier 
thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner is currently a livelier topic of histo-
riographical disputation, now that it has been imaginatively reformu-
lated by a new generation of historians of the American West. 
To be sure, Chandler's ideas have found their way into several pop-
ular textbooks, while The Visible Hand is frequently cited in the lead-
ing historical journals. Though citation counts are, at best, a highly 
imperfect measure of scholarly influence, they can provide a bench-
mark for comparison. Between 1978 and 1994, The Visible Hand was 
cited 26 times in the Journal of American History, the American 
67 Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New 
York, 1987). 
68 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and 
American Labor Activism (Cambridge, 1987); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's 
Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York, 1988). For a pointed critique of 
Montgomery's neglect of the organizational implications of technological advance, . see 
William Lazonick, "The Breaking of the American Working Class," Reviews in Anwncan 
Histo1;!/ 17 (June 1989): 272-283. . 
6 Michael McGerr, "The Persistence of Individualism," Chronicle of Higher Education 
39 (10 Feb. 1993), A48. 
1o "Jay Gould: Robber Baron or Industrial Statesman?" in Firsthand America: A 
History of the United States, ed. David Burner, Virginia Bernhard, and Stanley I. Kutler (St. 
James, N.Y., 1996). 
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Historical Review, ~-d_ Reviews in American History. This total 
exceeded that of most other major works in business and economic his-
tory that had been published at roughly the same period. Robert W. 
Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman's Time on the Cross (1974), for exam-
ple, was cited 24 times, Galambos's 1970 essay on the organizational 
synthesis, lp times, and Cochran's Frontiers of Change (1981), 6 times. 
In addition, The Visible Hand was cited more frequently than several 
well known and influential works from related disciplines, including 
Clifford Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), 21 cites, and 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1975), 12 cites. The Visible' 
Hand was, however, by no means the most cited work by an American 
historian. Several of these more frequently cited works focused, not 
smprisingly, on topics in social history. These included Paul Johnson's 
Shopkeeper's Millennium (1978), 28 cites; Herbert G. Gutman's Work, 
Culture, and Society in Industrializing America (1976), 32 cites; 
Edmund S. Morgan's American Slavery American Freedom (1975), 34 
cites; E. P. Thompson's Making of the English Working Class (1963), 
36 cites; and Eugene N. Genovese's Roll, Jordan, Roll (1974), 47 
cites.71 
The citation count reveals that The Visible Hand has been hardly 
ignored. Only occasionally, however, has it been the focus of extensive 
discussion at the annual meetings of the Organization of American 
Historians or the American Historical Association. Indeed, it would be 
hard to name more than a handful of essays in the Journal of American 
History or the American Historical Review that have engaged 
Chandler's work in detail. Even such a central Chandlerian metaphor 
as the visible hand has yet to receive the thoughtful attention that his-
torians have devoted to concepts such as the separate spheres, repub-
licanism, corporate liberalism, and the "market revolution."72 This is 
true even though The Visible Hand received the prestigious Pulitzer 
and Bancroft prizes, was widely hailed as a classic in the major histor-
ical journals upon its publication, and is generally regarded as the most 
71 These totals are derived from the CD-ROM version of the Arts and Humanities 
Citation Index. 
72 Any generalizations about the influence of Chandler's ideas on U.S. history textbooks 
must be tentative, since no one has made a thorough study of this topic. But there is good 
reason to suspect that Chandler's ideas are getting a hearing. Out of a sample of 10 leading 
college survey textbooks, all but 2 treated the rise of big business in a more-or-less 
Chandlerian spirit. For a possible model from a related field of how one might generalize 
about the treatment of business in history textbooks, see J. L. Heilbron and Daniel J. Kevles's 
"Science and Technology in U.S. History Textbooks---VVhat's There and What Ought to Be 
There," Reviews in American History 16 (June 1988): 173-185. 
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important historical study of the modem business enterprise to have 
been published at any time and in any language. 
Much of the explanation for this relative neglect can be traced to 
the oft-remarked disinclination of business historians to reflect in print 
on the state of the art. Unlike intellectual historians, women's histori-
ans, or historians of technology, business historians only occasionally 
have taken the trouble to prepare historiographical overviews of recent 
developments in the field. No one, for example, has prepared a survey 
of the literature of business history that is even remotely comparable 
to John M. Staudenmaieis Technology's Storytellers, with its lucid, 
comprehensive, and theoretically informed analysis of recent work in 
the history of technology-" Indeed, had Louis Galambos not published 
his various review essays, one could hardly speak of a historiographical 
literature in business history at all.74 
Chandler's unconventional subject matter has, one suspects, fur-
ther limited his influence. Most historians have long been suspicious 
of big business, and, accordingly, unwilling to invest the requisite time 
and energy necessary to master a book that is as long, dense, and ana-
lytically complex as The Visible Hand. Though at least one prominent 
social historian hailed it as a "masterly synthesis" that finally broke 
through the well-guarded barriers of academic subdisciplines, this is by 
no means a prevailing view. 75 When 11'.e Visible Hand was published 
in 1977, it was widely assumed that the "new" social history-with its 
distinctive preoccupation with marginalized groups, oppositional social 
movements, and small-scale, tightly larit communities-was on the 
cutting edge of American historiography. The goal, as the phrase went, 
was finally to tell the story of the American past "from the bottom up." 
The influence of the new social history on American historiography 
was pervasive. As Michael Kammen declared in 1980 in The Past 
Before Us, a major survey of recent historical writing that had been 
commissioned by the American 1-Iistorical Association, the new social 
history might well lay claim to having emerged, during the 1970s, as 
the "cynosure" of historical scholarship in the United States.76 Under 
73 John M. Staudenmaier, Technology's Storytellers: Reweaving the Iluman Fabric 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985). 
74 See, in addition to the essays cited above, Louis Galambos, ''What Makes Us Think 
We Can Put Business Back into American History?" Business and Economic History 20 
(1991): 1-11; and idem, "What Have CEO's Been Doing?" Journal of Economic Hi8tory 48 
(June 1988): 243-258. 
70 Zunz, Making America Corporate, 6. 
76 Michael Kammen, The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the 
United States (Ithaca, N.Y.,1980), 34. 
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the circumstances, it is not hard to understand why The Visible Hand, 
with its tight focus on the strategic decision making of a managerial 
elite, fell outside of the historiographical mainstream. Kammen, for 
example, felt no compunction to include an essay on recent develop-
ments in busin~ss history in The Past Before Us. Neither, for that mat-
ter, did Stanley I. Kutler in The Promise of American History, an influ-
ential survey of American historiography that originally appeared in 
1982 as a special issue in Reviews in American History. And neither 
did Eric Foner in The New American History, an overview of recent 
historical writing, published in 1990, that, like The Past Before Us, bore 
the imprimatur of the American Historical Association.77 Chandler 
was similarly neglected in Peter Novick's That Noble Dream, a major 
study of the quest for a value-neutral history, even though Chandler 
had been engaged in just such a search for almost forty years. 78 
More recently, the new social history has been supplanted by cul-
tural studies as the dominant tradition of scholarship in American his-
torical writing. Notwithstanding this shift, it seems unlikely that the 
current generation of historians will display a more generous appreci-
ation of Chandler's achievement. Chandler always treated culture as a 
residual category and rarely devoted much attention even to conven-
tional approaches to the history of ideas. And it is far from self evident 
that The Visible Hand has much to contribute to current debates over 
multiculturalism, identity politics, or the social construction of race, 
class, and gender. No longer can it be taken for granted, as Galambos 
recently warned, that Chandlerian business history will soon come to 
exert a major influence on the way most Americans historians write 
about the past. 79 ,, 
• • • 
While the influence of The Visible Hand in American historiography 
may well be more limited than many business historians might wish or 
assume, many imaginative historians have adopted, revised, or reject-
ed Chandler's managerial thesis. Most of these historians fall into one 
77 Stanley I. Kutler and Stanley N. Katz, ed., The Promise of American History: 
Progress and Prospects (Baltimore, Md., 1982); Eric Foner, ed., The New American History 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1990). 
. 
7~ Peter N~ck, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Questionn and the American 
Histon:cal Profession (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). Chandler was cited only once in Novick's 
book, 1n a passing reference to non-leftist historians, 439. 
79 Galambos, "What Makes Us Think," 6. 
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of three broad categories: champions who elaborated on Chandler's 
analysis and share his basic approach; critics who probed anomalies 
between Chandler's framework and their own research; and skeptics 
who challenged Chandler's basic assumptions and rejected his argu-
ment outright. These categories, it should be stressed, are best 
thought of as points along a continuum rather than as mutually exclu-
sive positions. It is entirely possible, for example, to be simultaneous~ 
ly a champion of Chandler's method, a critic of certain features of his 
explanatory scheme, and a skeptic with respect to some of his more 
speculative claims. Yet this schema does help to organize into an intel-
ligible pattern a range of views that might otherwise defy easy catego-
rization, and, in this way, to clarify the major interpretative trends. 
Just as the Second World War shaped Chandler's intellectual out-
look, so, too, more recent events have informed the perspective of his-
torians who have grappled with Chandler's ideas. For most, the 
Second World War is far· less prominent as a frame of reference than 
the social movements of the 1960s, the economic recession of the 
1970s, and the recent collapse of communism in Eastern Euror)e and 
the former Soviet Union. These events have spawned a more jaun-
diced view of large-scale institutions-whether in business or goVern-
ment-as well as a heightened sensitivity to the cultural and environ-
mental consequences of economic growth. 
Among Chandler's champions are several of his students and a 
number of colleagues and former colleagues at the Harvard Business 
School. Though these historians have written on a wide variety of top-
ics, they had a similar intellectual agenda. Like Chandler, they shared 
a basically favorable assessment of the managerial revolution, stressed 
its technological and organizational dimensions, and assumed that it 
played a positive role in economic development and in sustaining the 
international competitive position of the United States. Intimately 
familiar with Chandler's ideas, often through first-hand acquaintance 
with the seminars Chandler participated in at Harvard, they applied 
Chandler's managerial thesis to phenomena that Chandler chose tc 
neglect. Their project, in short, at least with regard to Chandler" 
ideas, has been largely one of creative elaboration. 
Chandler's champions have included historians of technologi 
interested in the relationship of the modem business enterprise tc 
industrial research. These historians echoed Chandler's convictior 
that the modem business enterprise promoted technological advance 
Most highlighted the extent to which even seemingly incrementa 
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technological changes involf;d substantial investments. All stressed 
the major difference between the initial invention of a new product or 
production process, which often involved a relatively small financial 
outlay, and its successful commercialization, which almost always 
required the ldnd of investment that only a .large organization could 
make. Though th~se historians recognized that business leaders could 
deploy industrial research to stifle competition, they rejected the 
Veblenian charge that the goals of business and industiy were neces-
sarily opposed. 80 If anything, these historians faulted Chandler for pay-
ing insufficient attention to the dependence of technological advance 
on creative entrepreneurship. "In my opinion"-wrote W. Bernard 
Carlson, in a recent study of industrial research at General Electric 
that was heavily indebted to Chandler's ideas-"an analysis of the ori-
gins of managerial capitalism without a detailed examination of the 
corresponding technologies is only half the story; to understand fully 
the profound changes that occurred in the American economy 
between 1880 and 1920, we must understand how individuals shaped 
technology to sustain and reinforce new business arrangements."81 
Resolutely Chandlerian in outlook was Richard S. Tedlow's recent 
history of mass marketing. The origins of modem mass marketing, 
Tedlow posited, following Chandler's lead, were to be found in the new 
business environment created by the mid-nineteenth-century revolu-
tions in transportation and communication. Like Carlson, Tedlow 
highlighted the role in the decision malting process of creative entre-
preneurs. Indeed, at times, Tedlow flirted with the decidedly non-
Chandlerian position that entrepreneurial mass marketers could create 
consumer demand. In the end, however, Tedlow affirmed Chandler's 
conviction that the market remained an unpredictable, independent 
force, outside of business control. "No customer owes any company a, 
living,'' Tedlow declared, in summarizing his position: "But it is the 
company that takes the active role, and therein lies its power .... The 
customer disposes. But the company proposes."82 
00 W. Bernard Carlson, Innovation as a Social Process: Elihu Thomson and the Rise of 
General Electric, 1870-1900 (Cambridge, 1991); David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, 
Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 (Cambridge, 1988); Leonard 
S. Reich, The Making of Industrial Research: S~ience and Business at GE and Bell, 
1876-1926 (Cambridge, 1985). See also John Kenly Smith, Jr., "The Scientific Tradition in 
American Industrial Research," Technology and Culture 31 (Jan. 1990): 121-131. 
81 Carlson, Innovation as a Social Process, 353 n20. 
ai Richard S. Tedlow, New and bnproved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America 
(New York, 1990), 375. 
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Chandler's analysis of the managerial revolution also shaped sever-
al recent accounts of law and public policy.83 Like The Visible H~nd, 
these accounts focused on the challenge that the rise of the mo ern 
business enterprise posed for prevailing modes of corporate gover-
nance. Interestingly, historians most directly influenced by Chandler 
stressed the limited demands that tl1e leaders of th~ modern busmess 
enterprise placed on Congress, administrative agencies, and th~ co~rts. 
To a far greater extent than most previous historians, these histo~~ns 
minimized the influence of-the largest business firms on the political 
rocess. Most regulatory initiatives in the decades between 1880 and 
l920 they contended had been spurred not by the supporters of big 
b · ' b t rather by small business leaders fearful of the changes us1ness, u , , d l" · th 
being wrought by the managerial revolution. U.S. tra e. po icy m e 
earl twentieth century-explained William H. Becker, .i~ a penetrat-
ing ;tudy of business-government relations that was expkitly mdebt~ 
to Chandler's approachc-was shaped less by large firms m. highly co -
centrated industries than by small firms in highly compellllve sectors 
f ti 84 Equally Chandlerian have been several recent 0 1e economy. Th ''"nh t 
accounts of government-sponsored regulatory ventures: e 1 berend 
t f an industry" wrote Thomas K. McCraw, in a cele rate 
na ure o , "th . 1 ost impor 
review article on regulatory commissions, was e sing e m . -
tant context in which regulators must operate.~•85 La:"Yer . Lo:ns 
Brandeis was wrong--McCraw added, in a Pulitzer-Pnze wmmng 
account of government regulatory policy-to treat the failure o~ mt~­
ers in sectors where consolidation brought few benefits as proo o t e 
s3 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise in American Law, 1836-1937 (Camb~d~~a~:s~~ ~:~,~~~~~-~;~;'( t!~~~;!, ~~:~ ~~~;)~F~m:~~:;:,~~~~ ~a~:jE;':~';,~~~~~: 
United States Experience inh C~~pefa:~:e Mo'le':.:i1~~~~strial Enterprise, ed. Alfred D. 
Comparative Perspectives on~ e wtcambridge Mass., 1980), 161-181; Tony A. Freyer, ~:;z~~~gJ~igm~~s~::~n::;:k c;:e;:r:Zri~~:r;;~~m;:i~e~:~~~=ri~~:m;:~;~ 
1992); idem, Forums of ~h · 1 W. M C d ''The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and 
(Greenwich, Conn., 1979); . ares · c ~r y, 1869-1903,, Business History Review 53 t~e !:~~e~~)~on3:~:;~~a:m:?.:(~:~~an a~w and the 'Marketing Structure ~~l~fge 
6ou orations, i875-1890,;, Journal of Econo~ic History ~8 (Sept. 1978): ed the work 
ch7odler's institutional approach tlo go'Bemm~nt-i?dusyy ~:1::;:~~d ~~e~h~E17. See, for 
of several leading historians who iave ocuse pnm~1:1 y R l ti nd Deregulation in 
example, Richard H. K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: egu a on a 
America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). Rel · I dustry and 
M William II. Becker, The Dynamics of Business-Government ~~ns: n Left and 
Expor:s, 1F893--:192pl ~:hi~~~~g~~l9g!2~fN~:~~~: J:1:e~~::::tion,''~~~:ss History 
Amencan oreign oucy 
Revi~ ~r~~::nf. l~~~~a~-=~~lation in America: A Review Article," Business History 
Review 49 (Summer 1975): 181. 
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ineffectiveness of mergers in sectors where consolidation hastened 
major efficiency gains. 86 
McCraw predicated his analysis on the Chandlerian distinction 
between center and peripheral firms. Managers in center frrms could 
take advantage of technological advances to consolidate their market 
position; managers in peripheral firms could not. This basic differ-
ence, McCraw posited, was far more important than political, cultural, 
or social factors in explaining how the American economy evolved. 
"The economic and technological characteristics of certain indus-
tries"-McCraw explained, in a formulation that was plainly indebted 
to Chandler-" encourage them to assume either a center or peripher-
al configuration and to maintain that configuration over a long period 
of time. These characteristics now seem much more important than 
do differences in legal systems or national cultures; in fact they appear 
to determine the relative size and organizational structure of firms 
within the industries represented."87 
While Chandler's champions have creatively elaborated on his 
stage model and explanatory scheme, his critics have fixed the spotlight 
on anomalies in his account. Some of these critics have been recent 
Ph.D.'s intrigued by the disjunction between certain features of 
Chandler's analysis and their own research. Others were established 
historians troubled by the normative implications of Chandler's find-
ings. A few contended that Chandler understated the significance of 
the managerial revolution; others that he exaggerated its import. All 
agreed that there were important phenomena that Chandler's analysis 
failed to explain. Their task, in short, has been basically one of revi-
sion. 
The emergence of such a critical tradition was a largely inevitable 
byproduct of Chandler's achievement. Broad-ranging works invite 
criticism, and The Visible Hand was no exception. No one has been 
more aware of this than Chandler himself. "A historian's task," 
Chandler wrote in 1971, "is not merely to borrow other people's theo-
ries or even to test their theories for them. It is to use existing concepts 
and models to explore the data he has collected in order to answer his 
own particular questions and concerns. If a concept does not seem to 
aG Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. 
Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn. (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), esp. 99-101; idem, 
"Rethinking the Trust Question," in idem, ed., Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981): 1-55. 
81 McCraw, Praphets of Regulation, 77. 
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help, he should throw it away."88 Chandler's critics, to a greater extent 
even than Chandler's champions, have taken this particular piece of 
Chandlerian advice to heart. 
Few historians have written explicitly about Chandler's treatment 
of the American economy in the early republic. Yet it is not difficult to 
point to differences between Chandler's analysis of this period and the 
leading specialists' accounts. Some historians questioned the role that 
Chandler assigned to anthracite coal as a catalyst for mass production. 89 
Dolores Greenberg, for example, has published a pair of intriguing 
essays that, without citing Chandler directly, raised major questions 
about his account of the role of new energy sources an agents of 
change.90 
Particularly problematic has been Chandler's characterization of 
this period as an economic ancien r6gime. Specialists have been far 
more inclined to stress the economic vitality of the early republic, and, 
in particular, to endorse Thomas C. Cochran's un-Chandlerian con-
tention that American culture in this period was a major catalyst for 
economic development. "Entrepreneurial attitudes and strategies for 
upward economic mobility pervaded the free population of the British 
North American colonies throughout the first two centuries of 
European settlement," declared financial historian, and former 
Chandler student, Edwin J. Perkins, in endorsing Cochran's position: 
"In retrospect. .. Cochran was on the mark when he first stressed the 
revolutionary character of the American economic system and the 
depth of business values within the society."91 While Chandler never 
disputed the notion that entrepreneurial values in the early republic 
were widely shared, he accorded them far less significance than tech-
nological advance in explaining the coming of industrialism. Cochran 
and Perkins argued for a shift in emphasis from institutions to culture, 
and several historians have followed their lead. 
aa Chandler, "Business History as Institutional History," 305. 
89 James Livingston, Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 
1850-1940 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994), 28. See also Thomas R. Winpenny, "Hard Data on 
Hard Coal: Reflections on Chandler's Anthracite Thesis," Business History Review 53 
(Summer 1979): 247-258. 
90 Dolores Greenberg, "Reassessing the Power Patterns of the Industrial Revolution: 
An A_nglo-~erican Comparison," American Historical Review 87 (Dec. 1982): 1237-1261, 
and idem, Energy, Power, and Perceptions of Social Change in the Early Nineteenth 
Century," American Historical Review 95 (June 1990): 693-714. 
91 Edwin J. Perkins, "The Entrepreneurial Spirit in Colonial America: The Foundations 
~£Modern Business History," Business History Review 63 (Spring 1989): 160-186, quota-
tion on 185--186, and Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants 
and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1986). 
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Cochran's alternative account of American economic development 
in this period highlighted the importance of organizational innovations 
that antedated the railroad and the telegraph. These included the cre-
ation of a canal network, the expansion of the postal system, and the 
emergence qf a political order to facilitate manufacturing and com-
merce. Cochran also questioned, at least implicitly, Chandler's claim 
that the American market in the pre-railroad era was too geographi-
cally dispersed to encourage organizational innovation within the busi-
ness enterprise. "Nowhere else in the world of 1800"-wrote Cochran 
in Frontiers of Change, a major study of early American industrialism -
that appeared four years after The Visible Hand-"were two cities as 
big as New York and Philadelphia only eighty miles apart and brought 
into close contact by waterways and level terrain."92 Taken together, 
Cochran posited, these changes spurred a "b_usiness revolution" that 
greatly speeded the flow of commercial information, but which owed 
little to the railroad, telegraph, or anthracite coal.93 
In large measure, the contrast between Chandler's and Cochran's 
approach to the industrial revolution was a matter of interpretation. 
Chandler retained the traditional understanding of the industrial revo-
lution as a technological phenomenon that hinged on the widespread 
utilization of iron, steam power, and fossil fuel. As a consequence, he 
dated its advent in the United States to the 1830s, when anthracite coal 
first became widely adopted in American industry. From Chandler's 
perspective, thus, the United States lagged behind Great Britain by 
half a century. Cochran, in contrast, regarded the industrial revolution 
as a cultural phenomenon that could take a variety of technological 
forms. No longer was the concept identified, as Chandler .. had under-
stood it, with technological advances in factory production, metal 
working, and energy utilization. Rather, Cochran redefined it to 
embrace a constellation of cultural values that included positive atti-
tudes toward work, industry, and innovation. Following the establish-
ment of American independence, Cochran contended, this cultural 
outlook hastened the emergence of the all-purpose artisan as a key fig-
ure in American economic develop1nent. 
92 Thomas C. Cochran, Frontiers of Change: Early Industrialism in America (New 
York, 1981), 18-19. 
93 Thomas C. Cochran, "The Business Revolution,» American Historical Review 78 
(Dec. 1974): 1449-1466. For Chandler's critique of the "business revolution" theme, see 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., review of Cochran, Two Hundred Yearn of American Business, in 
American Hfatorical Review 83 (Feb. 1978): 264--265. 
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To put it somewhat differently, developments that Chandler 
re~arded as precursors but not preconditions to the managerial revo-
lution became for Cochran the most revolutionary phase in the indus-
trialization of the United States.94 For Chandler, the industrial revolu-
tion followed the widespread utilization in the 1830s of anthracite coal. 
For Cochran, in contrast, the industrial revolution had by this time 
already occurred. "_Certainly by 1825," Cochran wrote, "the first stage 
of the 1ndustnalization of the United States was over. If industrializa-
tion is thought of as 'revolutionary,' the 'revolution' had occurred."95 
Especially controversial has been Chandler's neglect of the politi-
cal dimension of economic development. Few historians have fol-
lowed Chandler in claiming that the main theme in the economic his-
tory of the early republic involved nothing more than a shift from 
unspecialized to specialized enterprise. Rather, they treated the econ-
omy and the polity as interrelated and highlighted the gradual trans-
formation of the United States from a mercantile to an unregulated 
economy. 96 The "roots of corporate development," declared McCraw, 
lay _"deep within the political state.'' This conclusion was markedly at 
vanance with Chandler's claim that the modern business enterprise 
traced its origin not to the polity, but, rather, to the novel organizational 
challenge posed by the railroad and the telegraph.97 Had Great Britain 
not stifled the economic development of its British North American 
colonies'. Cochran posited, in an unusually forthright and necessarily 
speculative assertion of this view, Britain's North America's colonies 
might well have _industrialized in the eighteenth century, beginning 
around 1750. This was because, Cochran explained, American culture 
was even rrwre conducive than Britain's to entrepreneurial achieve-
m~nt, and, thus, in the absence of restrictive commercial regulations, 
might well have industrialized first. 98 
Other critics have pointed to the pivotal role in American eco-
nomic development of large-scale public ventures such as the army, 
the military armory, government-chartered state and federal banks, 
94 Chandler, review of Cochran Tivo Hundred Years 265 IJ5 ' , • 
Cochran, Frontiers of Change, 77. 
gs Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, Md., 
~995). For a ~ore extended discussion of recent scholarship on law, public policy, and polit-
ical economy in the early republic, see Richard R. John, "Governmental Institutions as 
Agents of Change: Rethinldng American Political Development in the Early Republic 
1787-1835," Studies in American Political Development 11(Fall1997): 347-380. ' 
97 Thomas K. McCraw, "Business and Government: The Origins of the Advers Relat~~nship," California Management Review 26 (Winter 1984): 50, ary 
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(New York, 1985), 23. 
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and the postal system-'; The postal system, for example, hastened the 
creation of a national market for commercial information a generation 
before the railroad established a national market for goods. 100 A few 
historians have pointed to the institutional ramifications not only of the 
administrative apparatus of the state and central government, but also 
of the cour\s, political parties, and the legal order. In a suggestive 
monograph on the political economy of industrialization in the United 
States and Prussia, Colleen A. Dunlavy demonstrated how the "struc-
turing presence" of the state shaped railroad policy in both countries. 
In contrast to most previous historians-who, like Chandler, stressed " 
the weakness of the American state in the early republic-Dunlavy 
concluded that the various American state governments were more 
active than the Prussian central government in promoting economic 
development. A similar political dynamic, Dunlavy observed, 
explained why early American railroad leaders proved unable to estab-
lish effective trade associations that were truly national in scope and 
why American engineering societies retained a decentralized cast.101 
Dunlavy was by no means the only historian to raise questions 
about Chandler's treatment of the railroad during its formative years. 
Labor historian Walter Licht, for example, challenged Chandler's con-
tention that rationality was the primary goal of early railroad managers. 
"Bureaucratic work organizations" on the early railroads, Licht 
observed, were not the results of some "naturally immanent, 
inevitable, uniform movement" toward greater degrees of rationality 
and organization. Rather they emerged as part of a complex unfolding 
process that involved people, conscious decision making, personal 
99 
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mass production, see Donald R. Hoke, Ingenious Yankees: The Rise of the American System 
of Mass Production in the Private Sector (New York 1990). 
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Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United 
States and Prussia (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 4. 
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interests and human conflict.102 Others doubted that the railroad 
proved ~uite so successful as Chandler assumed in wresting from the 
express industry the carriage of high-volume freight. 103 Still others 
ti ned Chandler's claim that the economies of speed that the rail-ques o d · · 
d made possible loomed larger than political consi erat10ns m 
:;laining the major reductions in postal rates that took place in 1845 
and 1851.104 ] 
For the most part, however, Chandler's analysis of 1~5rganizationa innovation by railroad managers has gone unchallenged. No one, for 
example, has yet attempted a full-scale history of the Pen~sylvama 
Railroad during the mid-nineteenth century, eve~ though this enter-
prise was, for Chandler, the pre-eminent mailagenal e.n:erpnse in.the 
United States. At a number of junctures, however, cntics have raised 
questions about certain features of Chandler's argument. In a sugges-
tive article, Charles F. O'Connell, Jr., demonstrated that the Army 
Corps of engineers helped devise organizationril innovations sue~ as 
the line-and-staff principle that would later be adopted by Amencan 
management.100 • 
Others questioned Chandler's contention that the railroad was the 
first American enterprise to call forth a demand for middle managers. 
In a recent history of the postal system in the early republic, for exam-
ple, Richard R. John documented that, according to Chandler's own 
criterion, public administrators had established in the postal system a 
three-tiered administrative hierarchy, with a cohort of illlddle man-
agers, several decades before the coming of th~ railroad. The key orga-
nizational innovation was the establishment in 1800 of a network of 
specially designated postal distribution centers, staffed by middle m:m-
agers, to coordinate the stagecoach-based hub-and-spoke. sortmg 
scheme. Chandler dated the establishment of these d1stnbution cen-
ters to the 1850s, following the switchover from the stagecoach to the 
r02 Walter Llcht, Workingfor the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth 
CentunJ (Princeton, N.J., 1983), 270-271. C l" 
1o:l' Peter Zigmund Grossman, "Contract and Conflict: A Study of the Express arte 
(PhD diss Washington University, 1992). th 
· rOo R' .h, d R J h "Private Mail Deliverv in the United States during the Ninetee~ 
ic ar · o n, -j. I )· 131 143"d S adtng Century-A Sketch," Business and Economic Htstory 15 1986 · - , l em, pre 
the News, 254-255. ·1 d h' t · Alb Martin's 
wo Characteristic of recent scholarship in American rru roa . 1s ory ts ro . 
resolutely Chandlerian Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, Reject.ion, and Rebirth of: v;~; 
American Force (New York, 1992). Also important is James D. Dtlts, The Great Roa . 
Building of the Baltimore & Ohio, the Nation's First RaUroad, 1828-1855 (Stanford, Cahf., 
1993). . f d M t" 87 116 
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railroad as the principal means of conveyance on the most heavily trav-
eled routes. John contended, on the contrary, that public administra-
tors had established these distribution centers decades earlier, follow-
ing the prior changeover from postriders to stagecoaches that had been 
hastened by the Post Office Act of 1792.107 
Historians of,~elegraphy have raised a number of analogous issues. 
Chandler's treatment of the telegraph industry was necessarily sketchy, 
smce, when he published The Visible Hand, the history of telegraphy 
remained largely unwritten. But this did not prevent him from accord-
ing the industry a major role as an agent of change. In addition to facil-
itating the coordination of production and distribution by business 
managers, Chandler posited, the telegraph, like the railroad, furnished 
business leaders with the "most relevant administrative models" for the 
modern industrial enterprise. 108 
But if the telegraph industry were indeed this important, then, or 
so contended several of Chandler's critics, the history of industrial 
enterprise would have to be significantly revised. The military, these 
critics observed, loomed far larger as a precedent for telegraph man-
agement than Chandler allowed. While Chandler was correct to high-
light the signillcance of the line-and-staff principle for telegraph man-
agement, telegraph historian Edwin Gabler observed, he downplayed 
this organizational innovation's unmistakably military provenance. 109 
Others questioned the role of telegraphy in railroad scheduling, raising 
questions about another Chandlerian theme.11° Curiously, no historian 
has systematically documented how the telegraph shaped American 
business enterprise, though this relationship was integral to the tech-
nologically driven account of economic development at the core of The 
Visible Hand. It is suggestive, in this context, that Chandler's student 
Menahem Blondheim wrote a history of the early years of Western 
Union that paid no more than incidental attention to the railroad at 
all. ui The continuing influence of the artisan-based craft tradition on 
telegraphic research and development, has, similarly, been highlighted 
by Paul Israel, making the industry seem decidedly less pathbreaking 
1
: John, Spreading the News, 75, 303 n49; Chandler, Visible Hand, 196. 
1 8 Chandler, Visible Hand, 79. 
1119 Edwin Gabler, The American Telegrapher: A Social History 1860-1900 (New 
Brunswick, N.J., 1988), 219 n25. ' 
110 See, for example, Joanne Yates, Control throufli Communication: The Rise of 
Systw;:1inAmericanManag~nt (Baltimore, Md., 1989), 23, 106. Menahem Blond11e1m, News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public 
lnfonnation in America, 1844-1897 (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). 
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than Chandler's account might lead one to supposen' Equally un-
Chandlerian was Richard B. DuBoff and Edward S. Herman's account 
of the political machinations of telegraph managers, business lobbyists, 
and public officials in shaping government-industry relations.113 Taken 
together, this scholarship-most of which, it must be underscored, 
remains quite fragmentary-was materially at variance with Chandler's 
analysis in The Visible Hand of the telegraph as a prototype of the mod-
ern, technologically driven industrial enterprise. 
Similar questions about Chandler's explanatory scheme have been 
raised by historians who specialize in the period between 1880 and 
1920. The completion of the railroad and telegraph network, specu-
lated legal historian Charles W McCurdy, may have been less impor-
tant in establishing the preconditions for the modern industrial enter-
prise than the creation by lawyers and business lobbyists of a national 
market. "What the NAACP Legal Defense fund accomplished for 
black Americans under the Fourteenth Amendment in the twentieth 
century," McCurdy provocatively concluded, "the legal-defense war 
chests" of I. M. Singer & Company and the four leading meatpackers 
accomplished between 1875 and 1890 for the vertically integrated 
industrial firm. 114 Mass marketing was far more successful than 
Chandler assumed, others claimed, in shaping the pattern of consumer 
demand.115 Economic efficiency was far less pivotal than market con-
trol, contended still others, in the turn-of-the-century merger move-
ment. Case studies of the consolidation process at Standard Oil, 
Carnegie Steel, Du Pont, and AT&T have each raised questions about 
the dynamics of change.116 In each case study, business leaders turned 
II2 Paul Israel, From Machine Shap to Industrial Laboratory: Telegraphy and the 
Chanfjng Context of American Invention, 1830-1920 (Baltimore, Md., 1992). 
3 Richard B. Du Eoff and Edward S. Herman, "Alfred Chandler's New Business 
Risto;?.;: A Review," Politics and Society 10 (1980): 102-104. 
1 4 Mccurdy, "American Law and the Marketing Structure," 649. 
us William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American 
Culture (New York, 1993); Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the 
American Mass Market (New York, 1989). 
ilG Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 
(Cambridge, 1985); Thomas J. Misa, A Nation of Steel: The Making of Modem America, 
1865-1925 (Baltimore, Md., 1995); idem, "Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from 
Technological Determinism," in Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 
115-141; Joseph A. Pratt, 'The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the Decline 
of Monopoly in Oil," Journal of Economic History 40 (Dec. 1980): 815-837; Yates, Control 
through Communication; Kenneth Lipartito, "When Wornen were Switches: Technology, 
Work, and Gender in the Telephone Industry, 1890-1920," American Historical Revtew 99 
(Oct. 1994): 1074--1111; Gan1et, Telephone Enterprise, esp. 8-9; Richard B. Du Eoff, 
Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States (Armonk, N.Y., 1989), 
51-54. 
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out to be neither as prescient nor as rationalistic as Chandler assumed. 
Particularly challenging has been the observation of economic histori-
an Gavin Wright that it would be a mistake to regard the stability of the 
American industrial order in the period between 1917 and the present 
as evidence of th~ economic efficiency of the modern industrial finn. 117 
And even if one could successfully defend Chandler's highly rationalis-
tic account of industrial consolidation, some worried about its lack of 
dramatic appeal. Chandlerian business histmy-complained the wide-
ly read business biographer, and former Chandler student, Harold C. 
Livesay-was the historiographical equivalent of a "neutron bomb" 
that killed off the entrepreneurs while leaving the organization 
intact. 118 
Perhaps the most suggestive and conceptually challenging of these 
criticisms focused on the social origins of the modem business enter-
prise. The establishment of a "new class" of middle managers to staff 
the modern business enterprise, declared Olivier Zunz in Making 
America Corporate, the most successful of these studies, was a triumph 
of the power of deductive reasoning rather than empirical research.119 
To till this gap, Zunz and several other historians have begun to inves-
tigate the social background of the men and women who brought the 
. managerial revolution to the United States. 
Social explanations for the rise of the modern industrial enterprise 
have taken two principal forms. At its most ambitious, proponents of 
this view have posited, following Martin Sklar and James Livingston, 
that the managerial revolution was best understood as a social move-
ment spearheaded by a small yet purposeful "corporate liberal" coali-
tion.120 Intent on consolidating its position at the apex of American 
society, this coalition pursued a complex social agenda that simultane-
ously quelled labor unrest, eroded worker autonomy, blunted class 
conflict, destroyed small-scale competitors, and legitimized capital as a 
117 Wright, "Regulation in America," 167. 
118 Harold C. Livesay, "Entrepreneurial Dominance in Businesses Large and Small, Past 
and Present," Business History Review 63 (Spring 1989): 1-21, quotation on p. 5; idem, 
"Entrepreneurial Persistence through the Bureaucratic Age," Business History Review 51 
(Winter 1977): 415-443. 
119 Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago, Ill., 1990), 6. For a 
useful review essay, see William H. Becker, "The Impact of America's Becoming Corporate: 
A Review Essay," Journal of Policy History 5 (1993); 355-365. 
120 Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: 
The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge, 1988); Llvingston, Pragmatism and the 
Political Economy of Cultural Revolution; idem, "The Social Analysis of Economic History 
and Theory: Conjectures on Late Nineteenth-Centu1y American Development," American 
Historical Review 92 (Feb. 1987): 69-95. 
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factor of production. Though the corporate liberals drew on the sup-
port of various groups outside of their ranks, and while their victory 
was hardly a conspiracy, Sklar, Livingston, and the other historians who 
shared their outlook characterized the managerial revolution as the 
work of a tiny, mostly homogeneous elite. 
For Zunz, in contrast, the pivotal agents of the managerial revolu-
tion were far more varied in social background and less single-minded 
in their objectives. Using the case study method that Chandler had 
deployed so effectively in Scale and Scope, Zunz analyzed organiza-
tional innOvation at Du Pont, Ford, Metropolitan Life, McCormick 
Reaper, and the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad. 
Notwithstanding the claims to the contrary of Sklar, Livingston, and 
others, Zunz documented how a large and remarkably heterogeneous 
segment of the American population found in big business a congenial 
home. In Zunz's account, middle-level managers actively shaped the 
managerial firm in order to guarantee themselves a secure livelihood 
and a challenging career. Or, as he put it, a large and diverse group of 
"rank-and-file capitalists" willingly relinquished individualism in order 
to participate in some of the most significant and challenging tasks of 
their generation.121 "The diverse group of individuals who staffed the 
early corporation"-Zunz concluded, in summarizing his position-
"did not so much react to the corporation as they did desigu it."122 In 
the process, they created a new work culture and a new middle class 
and hastened a relative simplification of the American cultural order: 
"Their multifaceted effort to create and live with giant organizations 
d d h . ty"l23 en e in a more omogeneous soc1e . 
Zunz's account put flesh and blood on Chandler's middle man-
agers. So, too, have several recent monographs on the highly gendered 
assumptions that shaped power relations within the modem business 
enterprise. Building on recent studies by social historians, the authors 
of these works extended Zunz's efforts to explore the social foundations 
of the managerial revolution beyond middle-level managers to lower-
level secretaries and clerks."" In so doing, they have begun to explore 
121 Zunz, Making America Corporate, 6, 49. 
122 Ibid 8 
123 Ibid:: 203. For an opposite assessment, which highlighted the role of the corpora-
tion in promoting cultural heterogenity and undermining social stability-through a divisive 
assault on unions, see McGerr, "Persistence of Individualism," A48, 
124 Angel Kwolek-Folland, Engendering Business: Men and Women in the Corporate 
Office, 1870-1930 (Baltimore, Md., 1994); Sharon Hartman Strom, Beyond the Typewriter: 
Gender, Class, and the Origins of Modem American Office Work, 1900-1930 (Urbana, Ill., 
1992); Llsa Fine, The Souls of the Skyscraper: Female Clerical Workers in Chicago, 
1870-1930 (Philadelphia, Pa., 1990); Susan Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, 
Managers, and Customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940 (Urbana, Ill., 1986). 
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markets and job ladders in order to increase job security and limit the 
power of foremen and subcontractors. Workers in small firms, in con-
trast, rarely enjoyed such a predictable working environment.131 In a 
few cases, historians even credited workers with helping to institute 
the various business-sponsored welfare programs lmown today as cor-
porate patemalism.132 No longer reflexively dismissed as little more 
than forums for anti-union propaganda, these programs have come to 
be seen as forerunners of the social policies that today have become 
identified with the modem welfare state. i33 
To be sure, many historians sympathetic to labor's ca-Use remain 
sharply critical of the transformation Chandler described. Missing 
from The Visible Hand, warned two early critics, was any acknowledg-
ment of the possibility that technology afforded a "potentially wide 
spectrum of choices" or that machines were inherently hazardous and 
imposed various degrees of tension and strain on their operators.
134 
Few labor historians today, however, echo Harry Braverman's once-
fashionable notion that management had a virtually free hand in 
imposing on the work force various forms of social control. On the 
contrary, most assume that everyone was constrained, managers and 
workers alike. And for a small but growing number oflabor historians, 
the most significant constraints on the work force could be traced to 
the American polity, and, in particular, to the determination of anti-
labor lawyers, judges, and legislators to limit the workers' ability to 
improve their common lot. i35 Chandler neglected these political con-
siderations, convinced that they were far less important than techno-
logical advances in shaping management strategy. For these critics, 
however, technological advances were far less central to the patterning 
of management-labor relations than what political scientist Victoria 
Hattam called the "distinctive institutional structure of the American 
isl Howell John Harris, "Getting it Together: The Metal Manufacturers' Association of 
Philadelphia, c. 1900-1930," in Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives on American Employers, ed. Sanford M. Jacoby (New York, 1991), 111-131. 
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Tann.ers of Endicott Johnson, 1890-1950 (Urbana, Ill., 1988); Charles W. Cheape, From 
Family Firm to Modern Multinational: Norton Company, a New England Enterprise 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Daniel Nelson, ~The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A 
Reexamination," Business History Review 56 (Autumn 1982): 335-357; idem, Managers and 
Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920 (Madison, 
Wisc., 1975). 
133 Berkovvitz and McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State, chaps. 1-3. 
134 Du Eoff and Herman, "Alfred Chandler's New Business History," 93. 
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' j f Chandler remained unpersuaded by these various attempts to sup-
plant the business enterprise as the unit of analysis.140 At times, how-
J ever, even Chandler found his commitment to the firm unduly restric-
tive. Indeed, ohe of the most important, though least-noted, historio-
graphical contributions of The Visible Hand has been Chandler's pop-
ularization of the concept of infrastructure as a catch phrase for an 
interrelated configuration of institutions that shaped the business envi-
ronment in areas such as transportation, communication, or energy. 
Curiously, Chandler confined his discussion of infrastructure primarily 
to the period between. 1840 and 1880. Largely omitted from his 
account was any sustained discussion of the possible role in the period 
after 1880 of electricity, telephony, and the automobile in shaping the 
modem business enterprise. Whether or not business historians will 
shift their unit of analysis from the firm to the infrastructure remains 
to be seen. If they do, they will be building once again on insights 
developed in The Visible Hand. 
• • • 
While various critics of The Visible Hand have raised important ques-
tions about Chandler's analysis of the rise of the modem business 
enterprise, most have shared Chandler's conviction that the manageri-
al revolution was a major turning point in the making of the modern 
United States. Their quarrel focused primarily on Chandler's explana-
tory scheme rather than his narrative design. For a small but not unin-
fluential group of skeptics, both Chandler's explanatory scheme and his 
narrative design are open to question. Some radical skeptics ques-
tioned the adequacy of any master narrative that sought to explain the 
rise of the United States to world power.141 Others proposed compet-
ing alternatives for the narrative that Chandler sketched. 
Prominent among the skeptics is the small but growing group of 
historians who are intent on rewriting the history of the rise of the 
modern business enterprise in the United States as a tale of missed 
chances and possibilities foreclosed. To a far greater extent than cham-
pions or critics, skeptics refused to limit their assessment of the mod-
ern business enterprise to economic criteria. Even if the modern busi-
ness enterprise could be shown to promote economic growth (and not 
140 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "Response to the Contributors to the Review Colloquium on 
Scale and Scope," Business History Review 64(Winter1990): 744. 
141 Philip Scranton, "Determinism and Indeterminacy in the .History of Technology," in 
Smith, Does Technology Drive History?, 143-168. 
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Brody, in a major review, expanded historians' intellectual horizons by 
forcing them to consider when and how craft-based manufacturing 
might have been cost competitive vvith mass production. More gener-
ally, Brody added, Fiore and Sabel encouraged historians to ponder 
whether the technological advances that Chandler highlighted could 
explain the present "paradigm of industrialism.'0146 Chandlerian busi-
ness history left too much out, warned Philip Scranton, a distinguished 
historian of specialty manufacturing who has long criticized business 
historians' Chandlerian preoccupation with mass production in the 
largest, most capital-intensive industrial sectors. This limitation was 
particularly evident, Scranton believed, in Scale and Scope, which was 
not the inclusive theory of industrial dynamism that Chandler claimed 
it to be, but, rather, an exhaustive history of the corporate form. For 
these historians, Chandlerian business history was like a wedding 
reception at which the master of ceremonies arbitrarily confined the 
musical offerings to the greatest hits of the Boston Fops.147 
Some historians of small business, to be sure, took pains to demon-
strate the compatibility between Chandler's findings and their own 
research.148 Others pointed to the limitations of Chandler's narrative. 
By focusing "obsessively" on "bigness and greatness," complained John 
N. Ingham, Chandler created a picture of American industry in the 
nineteenth century that was "curiously skewed and false."149 Small 
business, Mansel G. Blackford reminded us, has in the past accounted 
for much technological advance, and has always provided the lion's 
share of new jobs for women, minorities, and other marginalized 
groups. Why, then, should it be left out of historical accounts?150 To 
focus, as Chandler did, on the rise of big business, Scranton declared, 
kept historians from recognizing the broader material and sociocultur-
146 David Brody, "The Second Industrial Divide," Reviews in American History 13 (Dec. 
1985), 612-<il5. 
147 Philip Scranton, review of Scale and Scope, in Technology and Culture 32 (Oct. 
1991): 1102-1104, quotation on 1104. See also idem, "Diversity in Diversity: Flexible 
Production and American Industrialization, 1880-1930," Business History Review 65 (Spring 
1991): 27-90; and idem, "Small Business, Family Firms, and Batch Production: Three Axes 
for Development in American Business History," Business and Economic History 21 (1991): 
99-105; and idem, Endless Novelty: Speciality Production and American Industrialization, 
1865-1925 (Princeton, N.J., 1997). I am grateful to David B. Sicilia for the musical analogy. 
148 Steven Fraser, "Combined and Uneven Development in the Men's Clotlting 
Indust~," Business History Review 58 (Winter 1983): 522-547. 
14 Ingham, Mak.ing Iron and Steel, 19. , 
150 Mansel G. Blackford, A History of Small Business in American Life (New York, 
1991). See also idem, "Small Business in America: A Historiographic Survey," Business 
I-Iistory Review 65 (Spring 1991): 1-26. See also Juliet E. K. Walker, "Racism, Slavery, and 
Free Enterprise: Black Entrepreneurship in the United States before the Civil War," 
Business History Review 60 (Autumn 1986): 343-382. 
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have looked like had the managerial revolution somehow been fore-
stalled. In part, this is because many of Chandler's sharpest critics have 
assumed that the superior alternative to the Chandlerian managerial 
revolution would have been a managerial revolution in which the cen-
tral government assumed a much more prominent role in economic 
planning. At least one skeptic, however, has made the case for the via-
bility of a regional republican alternative to the corporate liberal poli-
ty that emerged by the First World War.156 Focusing on the railroad, 
political scientist Gerald Berk observed that much of the industry's 
expansion after 1870 was unnecessary, an assessment, interestingly, 
that Chandler shared. But Berk extrapolated from this finding the 
decidedly un-Chandlerian conclusion that technological and market 
considerations played a smaller role in the making of the modem 
industrial enterprise than political struggles in Congress, the courts, 
and regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
These struggles, Berk concluded, "determined" the technological and 
market considerations that Chandler treated as exogenous. In this way, 
Berk kept alive a critique of the modern business enterprise that dated 
back at least as far as the Progressive era, and that was revived briefly 
in the 1960s, when New Left historians such as Gabriel KoTh:o por-
trayed turn-of-the-century business leaders as desperate reactionaries 
skillfully manipulating the levers of power to preserve capitalism from 
collapse. Berk had greater confidence than Kolko in the viability of a 
regionalist (as opposed to a socialist) alternative to corporate liberal-
ism, and in the continuing viability of the craft-based economic order 
that Fiore and Sabel described. Notwithstanding these differences in 
emphasis, Berk shared Kolko's conviction that the economic order that 
did emerge was a tragic mistal<e. 
Historians who have specialized in the half century between 1790 
and 1840 have, perhaps not surprisingly, devoted more attention to the 
possibility that American economic development might have taken a 
different course. Since few capital-intensive institutions existed in this 
period, the future seemed more open-ended. None of these historians 
apposed industrialism outright. But many shared Cochran's conviction 
that the American economy reached an impressive plateau prior to the 
managerial revolution. From the skeptics' standpoint, to treat 
Chandler's managerial revolution as more fundamental than Cochran's 
business revolution was tantamount to taking a moral stand in an ongo-
156 Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 
1865-1917 (Baltimore, Md., 1994). 
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ing debate over the compatibility of big business and American values. 
For these historians, the benefits of American industrialism had been 
largely attained by 1840, while its costs would become increasingly evi-
dent following the emergence, after 1880, of the Chandlerian industri-
al firm. Though this debate focused primarily on culture and politics, 
occasionally it touched on economic issues as well. Cochran for exam-
ple, has gone lo far as to claim that the American econom; expanded 
faster in the period before 1840 than it did after this time, and, thus, to 
imply that the managerial revolution has been associated with a gener-
al slowdown in the rate of economic growth.157 
Cochran found particularly troubling the disjunction between the 
hierarchical structure of the modem business enterprise and the 
democratic ideals enshrined in the American political tradition. 
"There was, and has continued to be," Cochran believed, "a tension 
between the deference system necessa:ry to the smooth running of an 
authoritarian bureaucratic organization and normal Americans."158 
Given this tension, skeptics wondered if the modern business enter-
prise could ever be made politically accountable, as Chandler had 
hoped. From their standpoint, it was morally indefensible to treat pol-
itics, culture, and the environment as mere background factors that 
business historians could in good conscience leave for others to · 
explore. Building on Chandler's claim that organizational innovation 
was a strategy, as well as his critics' contention that technology and 
markets could be shaped by human will, the skeptics urged their peers 
to pay more attention to the choices their forebears made in the hopE 
that the current generation might recognize the full range of theii 
available options and build a future that was very different from the 
past. 
• • • 
Since its publication in 1977, The Visible Hand has sparked a live!; 
debate among historians about the role of organizational innovation ir 
American business. No other book has contributed more to our under· 
standing of the rise of the modern corporation and its internal dynam· 
ics. Few have better demonstrated the possibilities of a comparative 
social scientific approach. In particular, The Visible Hand demonstrat 
ed how a stage-based model of economic development could focrn 
157 Cochran, Challenges, 49-50. 
156 Ibid., 64. 
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attention on the radically disjunctive nature of historical change. Some 
historians championed Chandler's analysis as a persuasive and com-
pelling account of American economic development. Others were less 
convinced. Critics found troubling the extent to which Chandlerian 
business history was overly rationalistic, technology-driven, and 
strangely detached from what William Jam es once called the booming 
buzzing Confusion of everyday life. Skeptics rejected his narrative 
design as unhelpful or false and urged historians to abandon it alto-
gether. The "seductive appeal" of the visible hand metaphor-warned 
one senior British economic historian, in an unusually harsh assess-
ment-might well lead scholars into a world as "unreal as that of neo-
classical economics .. "159 
Though no consensus has emerged with regard to what Scranton 
has puckishly called the "post-Chandler sweepstakes," many historians 
have found merit in supplementing Chandler's internalist analysis of 
corporate dynamics with a more contex:tualist account of the wider cul-
tural, political, and social setting. Such a shift in focus is not without 
its problems. Subfields, by definition, cannot embrace everything, and 
business history is no exception. <'The business historian,'~ declared 
Henrietta M. Larson in 1948, "hopes that by providing facts and gen-
eralization he will help political, social, and cultural historians to write 
more intelligently about business and business men as these touch 
their various fields. He should not attempt to do this himself.''160 A 
similar caveat was voiced as recently as 1988 by Mira Wilkins, a well 
!mown historian of multinational enterprise. "Too frequently," Wilkins 
warned, business historians permitted their subject to become "dilut-
ed and subsumed" under others: "Our field is not economic history, 
not the history of an industry, not business biography, not social histo-
ry, it is business history and as such requires specialized, although 
never narrow attention."161 
Notwithstanding Larson's declaration and Wilkins' warning, it 
seems not only likely but also desirable that, in the future, business his-
torians will devote more attention to the wider political, cultural, and 
social context in which American business evolved. In so.doing, busi-
ness historians can be expected to build on concepts and insights 
l51J B. W. E. Alford, "Chandlerism, the New Orthodoxy, of U.S. and European Corporate 
Development?" Journal of European Economic History 23 (Winter 1994): 643. 
150 Henlietta M. Larson, Guide to Business History: Materials for the Study of 
American Business History and Suggestions for their Use (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 31. 
161 Mira Wilkins, "Business History as a Discipline," Business and Economic History 17 
(1988), 1. 
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drawn from cultural studies, semiotics, and other currently influential 
approaches.162 But they would miss an opportunity for creative syn-
thesis if they abandoned the comparative institutional approach to his-
torical change that lies at the core of the Chandlerian tradition. Such 
an intellectual reorientation will, almost certainly, limit the ability of 
business historians to make broad-brush generalizations of the kind 
that gave The Visible Hand its impressive explanatory power. But this 
limitation should be offset by the heightened ability of business histo-
rians to contribute to an ohgoing dialogne with social, political, and cul-
tural historians about the main themes of the American past. 
Interestingly, Chandler himself has hailed the possibilities of con-
textualism, even though it is an approach that he deliberately chose not 
to pursue. The historian, Chandler wrote in 1984, has "at least two 
exacting and exciting challenges." The challenge Chandler embraced 
was to develop concepts that, while derived from events and actions 
that occurred at a specific time and place, could be used as guideposts 
by scholars interested in related themes. The second challenge, 
Chandler explained, was to locate specific human events and actions to 
their political, cultural, and social setting.163 Chandler wisely restrict-
ed himself to the first of these challenges, well aware of the rigorous 
empirical and analytical demands that it presented. Building on 
Chandler's achievement, business historians are gradually turning their 
attention to the challenge that Chandler deliberately eschewed. If the 
trends surveyed in this essay persist, this latter, contextualist 
approach-grounded in specific institutional settings, though not nec-
essarily in the business firm-will become a dominant mode of inquiry 
for business historians in the United States. 
162 On the possibilities of cultural studies for business history, see Kenneth Lipartito, 
"Culture and the Practice of Business History," Business and Economic History 24 (Summer 
1995): 1--41. The very fact that Lipartito's essay won the Business History Conference's cov-
eted Newcomen Prize is indicative of the extent to which business history practitioners are 
recognizing the merits of contextualist and non-Chandlerian themes. 
163 Chandler, "Comparative Business History," 3. "One of the most challenging tasks of 
business history," Chandler has recently written, is the "placing [of] businessmen and their 
activities in a broad cultural setting." Chandler, "Editor's Introduction," in Robert F. Dalzell, 
Jr.'s, Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge, Mass., 
1987), vii. 
